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REGULATORY LINEARITY, COMMERCE CLAUSE 
BRINKSMANSHIP, AND RETRENCHMENT IN 
ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 
Joel B. Eisen* 
"One truism of historical evidence: 
rules that constantly have to be repeated 
and strengthened are no rules. "1 
Regulators regulate. They control, command, dictate, adjudge, 
and enforce. Increasingly, often under pressure to reform 
regulation, they experiment with market mechanisms and other 
"reinvention" tools. What happens when an agency's reinvention 
effort proves less than completely successful? If the agency admits 
the errors of its ways and drops back to the status quo ex ante, then 
it may face the same criticisms as it did before: it is stuck in an 
inefficient regulatory paradigm, slow to adapt to changing 
conditions, and so forth. If the agency persists with its original 
initiative in the face of mounting evidence that it is tilting at 
windmills, then it appears both obstinate and obtuse. Whatever the 
decision, the climate for reinvention at this point is probably a 
difficult one of stasis, where new ideas face serious challenges and 
perhaps even the prospect of immediate rejection. This is 
particularly likely if the agency has advanced relatively consistent 
proposals over time, rather than being flexible when its original 
ideas face trouble. 
Deregulation of the electric utility industry---or "restructuring," 
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1. DAVIDS. LANDES, THEWEALTHANDPOVERTYOFNATIONS 145 (1998). 
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as the industry is not being fully deregulated2-may well have 
reached this uneasy state. After over a decade of experimentation 
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") and state 
Public Utility Commissions ("PUCs"), success is hard to find, and 
criticism of FERC and the states is abundant. Resistance to 
deregulation of the wholesale market for electricity is in full flower, 
particularly in Southern and Western states and in Congress, where 
various pending energy bills would virtually strip FERC of its 
ability to proceed with restructuring efforts. Formation of Regional 
Transmission Organizations ("RTOs"), the intermediaries at the core 
of FERC's effort to promote a national wholesale market,3 has been 
fitful at best. Retail access, the vaunted ability of consumers to 
choose their own electricity supplier, is in full retreat. In states 
where it had initially been successful, it is less so now, and in many 
states, there are no viable competitors to incumbent utilities. The 
centerpiece of restructuring-design . and implementation of 
wholesale markets for electricity-is happening quickly in some 
parts of the nation and is moribund in others, even after four 
attempts on FERC's part to promote a nationwide solution. 
Here we are at a crossroads with deregulation: so much 
promise, so much failure, and so many unanswered questions. 
Stakeholders have a high degree of frustration. Many view the 
situation as something of a regulatory "Gordian Knot,''4 where any 
path forward or backward has high negatives. Still, we cannot 
simply assume that the frustrating present situation in and of itself 
merits ending the experiment. 
In this Article, I focus on the bumpiness of the restructuring 
process and what it suggests about the future. After describing in 
Part I the difficult current status of restructuring, I move on to 
2. Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and 
Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 
WIS. L. REV. 763, 781 n.70 [hereinafter Rossi, Hard Look Doctrine]. Professor 
Rossi states: 
Id. 
"Deregulation" is probably too strong a word to describe the 
desirable nature of regulatory reform in the electric utility industry. 
There is disagreement concerning the appropriate level of 
deregulation and privatization of bulk power generation. . . . 
Therefore, with a few exceptions, I generally describe what are 
commonly referred to as "deregulatory'' efforts in bulk power 
generation markets--efforts more akin to incentive regulation to 
equalize or improve competition than pure deregulation-under the 
rubric of "restructuring." 
3. See infra Part I. 
4. I am indebted to Sue Kelly of the American Public Power Association 
for this metaphor. 
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discuss the relevance of FERC's attempts to fine-tune its initiatives. 
In Part II, I discuss a theory that agencies that continue to promote 
their reinvention efforts notwithstanding serious obstacles, and that 
appear to resist adopting other potentially desirable means of 
achieving their goals, are stifling the very innovation they promise. 
I use the term "regulatory linearity" to refer to this specific 
behavioral pattern. "Linear," in this Article, has two of its common 
understandings: first, that an agency has been constrained in its 
thinking about the reinvention effort, and second, that it has seen 
the process in a "point-A-to-point-B" mentality that limits its ability 
to adapt to changing conditions. 
We do not have a long-standing record of innovation in 
regulatory agencies, and consequently, we have a less well-
developed body of literature on the process of incrementally testing 
out new ideas. So deciding whether an agency has been "linear" and 
not simply defeated by concerns beyond its control is going to 
involve a bit of guesswork. There are some bedrock principles I 
develop and apply to this situation. As one example, I discuss the 
role of flexibility. Because the agency is attempting to transcend its 
original regulatory mandate, I find it indispensable that it maintain 
a spirit of flexibility and adaptability, modifying its initiative to 
adapt to difficulties of implementation or macroeconomic or political 
concerns. 
Sheer persistence in promoting an idea and difficulty or 
unwillingness to adapt it during the implementation period create 
an agency climate directly antithetical to a spirit of bringing about 
change. At that point, the agency has proven to be an ineffective 
actor for bringing about positive change, and the costs of proceeding 
with the innovation outweigh the likely benefits. One result of this 
is that stakeholders spend more time, effort, and money fighting 
over the original innovation rather than overcoming the current 
constraints on innovation. To test whether this is the case in 
restructuring at present, I examine a case study of the parrying 
back and forth between state regulators and FERC over the limits of 
each other's regulatory jurisdiction. This has created a condition of 
"Commerce Clause brinksmanship," in which progress is held 
hostage to a protracted debate over the constitutional balance of 
power between the federal government and the states. 
My case study involves the litigation among FERC, state PUCs, 
and the American Electric Power Company ("AEP"), which is a 
major investor-owned utility ("IOU") in the Midwest and Southeast, 
over AEP's integration into PJM Interconnection (an RTO). FERC's 
novel argument for advancing the integration of AEP into PJM, 
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based on a little-known provision of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"),5 relied in turn on the core concept 
that AEP's integration into PJM would bring economic benefits to 
consumers. For this reason, the AEP case tested both the limits of 
federal jurisdiction and the proposition that restructuring will be 
economically beneficial. Not surprisingly, this garnered 
considerable attention for the case across the nation. 
The evidence to date, including the record of AEP's integration 
into PJM, suggests that there is ample blame to go around for 
restructuring's problems, and ultimately, I find that FERC's pattern 
of regulatory behavior does not rise to the level of "linearity." In 
search of a way to break the current stalemate, I then outline three 
possible strategies in Part Ill. These include giving FERC bolstered 
authority to bring about restructuring, ending the restructuring 
effort, and continuing FERC's ongoing experimentation with market 
mechanisms (notably the formation of RTOs). I conclude that the 
central lesson of the current stalemate is that finding a new means 
of achieving the goals of deregulation that would generate 
momentum toward progress may be more appropriate than 
returning to traditional cost-of-service regulation (that is, 
abandoning deregulation altogether). 
I. THE GoRDIAN KNOT OF RESTRUCTURING 
The story of restructuring's journey is a familiar one, and I will 
sketch it only briefly. Historically, the electric utility industry was 
the subject of a cozy regulatory compact. In return for exclusive 
monopolistic franchises, utilities assumed a duty to serve consumers 
in their territories and an obligation to subject themselves to 
regulation of rates and other matters by state PUCs.6 Until 
recently, these monopolists were vertically integrated concerns that 
handled the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. 
IOUs produced a major share of the nation's electricity, with 
municipal utilities, federally owned marketers, and cooperatives 
producing and distributing a smaller share.7 The Federal Power Act 
5. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 
Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-1 to -4, 2601-2645 (2000)). 
6. See generally Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to Serve" and 
Protection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility 
Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1998). 
7. In 1998, IOUs generated 68% of the nation's electricity. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC 
POWER INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE 23 (2000), available at http://www.eia.doe. 
gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_stru_update/update2000. pdf [hereinafter THE 
CHANGING STRUCTURE 2000]. By 2001, that percentage had dropped to 49.1% 
but still outweighed the contribution from nonutility generators, although that 
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("FPA") gave the federal government responsibility for regulation of 
the transmission of electricity in interstate commerce and the sale of 
electricity at wholesale.8 "Wholesale," a term of art in the electric 
utility field, means sales other than "retail" sales of electricity to end 
consumers, which have historically been regulated by the states, as 
the FPA prohibits federal regulation over retail sales and facilities 
used for the generation and local distribution of electricity.9 
Until the 1980s, the industry existed in a safe, undisturbed 
world, with little or no competition in the production and 
distribution of electricity.10 The airlines and phone companies could 
break up and revolutionize the foundation of the economy. 
Electricity, however, was the last bastion of the natural monopoly. 11 
Introducing some market character to the industry was an idea that 
had been percolating for decades, 12 and it began to get traction when 
federal statutory enactments opened the door to competition.13 The 
first of these was PURPA, which, in an attempt to encourage 
cogeneration and small power production, created a class of 
"Qualifying Facilities" ("QFs") whose power utilities were required 
to purchase under certain terms.14 This essentially invented a 
percentage was increasing. Edison Elec. Inst., Industry Statistics, at 
http://www.eei.org/industry _issues/industry _overview _and_statistics/industry _ 
statistics/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). 
8. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2000). 
9. Id. § 824(b)(l). 
10. Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 
ENVTL. L. 435, 438 (2002) ("Traditional utilities were immune from competition 
in their monopoly protected service areas[,] ... were rewarded for building, had 
a virtually guaranteed rate of return, and were immune from competition."). 
11. Rossi, Hard Look Doctrine, supra note 2, at 779-80 ("Traditionally, most 
regulators considered the electric utility industry a paradigmatic natural 
monopoly."); see also Claire A. Watkins, Nuclear Power Rate Regulation After 
Eastern Enterprises: Are Ratepayers Being Taken for a Ride?, 28 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 191, 208 (2000) ("[T]he deregulation of the electric industry 
followed the deregulation of telecommunications, natural gas and the airline 
industries."). 
12. Joseph T. Kelliher, The Need for Mandatory Electric Reliability 
Standards and Greater Transmission Investment, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 717, 730 
(2005) ("[C]ompetition has roots in federal electricity law that can be traced 
back to the 1930s. "). 
13. Id. ("It was Congress that introduced competition in wholesale power 
markets, not the Commission."); Tomain, supra note 10, at 438 ("With the 
stimulus of Congress, most notably through the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), the electricity industry began easing 
transmission access to nonutility electricity producers and, thus, the window to 
competition opened." (footnote omitted)). 
14. Section 210 of PURPA, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3, provides certain incentives 
for the development of cogeneration and small power production facilities and 
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market for generation where none had previously existed. The 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 further encouraged competition by 
promoting "wheeling'' (transmission of generated power across the 
grid). 15 During the 1990s, the wholesale market expanded rapidly. 
Merchant plants selling generated electricity to the grid came 
online, and more electricity traveled across the grid than before.16 
Currently, over half of the electricity generated is exchanged first on 
the wholesale market.17 
FERC did not originate the idea of competition but responded to 
changing conditions by attempting to promote competition. The core 
of FERC's restructuring platform is a series of four different orders 
and rules advanced since 1996 that encompass different formulas 
for promoting deregulation in the wholesale market. Order No. 888 
required all utilities that owned, controlled, or operated facilities 
used for transmission in interstate commerce to file open-access, 
nondiscriminatory transmission tariffs that contain minimum terms 
and conditions of nondiscriminatory service, take transmission 
service for their own wholesale sales and purchases of electric 
energy under the open-access tariffs, and develop and maintain a 
same-time information system that would give existing and 
potential transmission users the same access to transmission 
information as they had.18 
gives FERC the authority to exempt such facilities from most aspects of public 
utility regulation. The FERC rules implementing section 210 of PURPA 
provide, among other things, that cogeneration and small power production 
facilities qualifying under section 210 (QFs) have a right to interconnect with 
utilities for the purposes of selling power to and purchasing power from electric 
utilities, with sales to ·be accomplished at the utilities' "avoided costs." 
Conservation of Power and Water Resources, 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.303-.304 (2004). 
For a discussion of PURPA's contemporary impact, see Steven Ferrey, 
Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States' Rights: Discerning the 
Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 507 (2004). 
15. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 721, 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2002). 
16. Kelliher, supra note 12, at 717-18 (citing OFFICE OF MKT. OVERSIGHT 
AND INVESTIGATIONS, FERC, STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT: AsSESSMENT OF 
ENERGY MARKETS FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 2002 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2003, at 
64 (2004), available at http://www.ferc.govflegal/ferc-regsfland-docs/som-2003. 
pdf). 
17. See, e.g., ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H. Doc 108-145, at 162 
(2d sess. 2004) ("Today, more than half of all electricity generated is exchanged 
on the wholesale market before it is sold to consumers."), available at http://usa. 
usembassy .de/etexts/econ/eop/2004/2004_erp. pdf. 
18. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded 
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 
10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385). 
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Order No. 888 encouraged the use of "Independent Service 
Operators" ("ISOs"), 19 entities that would ensure utilities would no 
longer monopolize their own transmission lines. The order set out a 
number of guidelines for FERC to approve an ISO, including 
governance structured in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner and 
financial independence of the ISO and its employees from the 
economic performance of any market participant. 20 The intent was 
to allow the ISO to make independent and fair decisions about 
access to the grid. A single ISO would operate as large a grid as 
possible, and the ISO would schedule all transmission on the portion 
of the grid it controlled. 21 Additionally, it would have the primary 
responsibility of ensuring the short-term reliability of the grid and, 
through its pricing policies, promote the efficient use of and 
investment in transmission.22 
While Order No. 888 acknowledged the sweeping change 
underway in the electric power industry (with IS Os becoming 
managers of considerable portions of the transmission grid), FERC 
quickly found it needed to do more. In 2000, it promulgated a rule 
known as Order No. 200023 that had as its goal encouraging "all 
transmission-owning entities in the Nation, including non-public 
utility entities, [to] place their transmission facilities under the 
control of appropriate RTOs in a timely manner."24 At the time of 
Order No. 2000, FERC had approved only five ISO proposals.25 The 
five ISOs had considerable differences in operational 
responsibilities, geographic scope, and market operations.26 
Numerous efforts to create other ISOs had ended in failure. In 
FERC's view, this industry structure lacked the uniformity 
necessary to ensure reliability over the nationwide grid. FERC 
wanted Order No. 2000 to bring organization to the industry and 
19. Id. at 21,551. 
20. Id. at 21,596. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (Mar. 8, 
2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
24. Id. 
25. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 815 (Jan. 6, 
2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). The five were the California ISO, PJM 
ISO, ISO New England, the New York ISO, and the Midwest ISO. Id.; see THE 
CHANGING STRUCTURE 2000, supra note 7, at 76-77 (providing a table of ISOs 
with their operating dates and other data); see also AM. PuB. POWER AsS'N, 
RESTRUCTURING AT THE CROSSROADS: FERC ELECTRIC POLICY RECONSIDERED 1 
n.1 (2004) (noting that four of these five were later certified as RTO-compliant), 
available at http://www.appanet.org/files/PDFs/APPA WhitePaperRestructuring 
atCrossroads 1204. pdf. 
26. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 815. 
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avoid repetition of the haphazard results achieved under Order No. 
888. 27 The Commission found that "traditional management of the 
transmission grid by vertically integrated electric utilities was 
inadequate to support the efficient and reliable operation that is 
needed for the continued development of competitive electricity 
markets."28 FERC believed enhanced mega-grid controllers (RTOs) 
could improve grid management and reliability.29 
FERC set forth minimum standards for an RT030 but 
maintained a flexible approach that allowed industry participants to 
satisfy the standards in a number of ways.31 FERC required that by 
October 15, 2000 . all public utilities that were not already 
participating in an ISO file with it a proposal for an RTO or a 
description of their efforts to join an existing RT0. 32 The 
Commission repeatedly stressed that it was seeking voluntary . 
compliance.33 However, this was a serious shortcoming of Order No. 
2000. Because it stopped short of ordering utilities under FERC's 
jurisdiction to participate in RTOs, it left a vacuum in a number of 
regions into which few utilities were willing to jump. It is not 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 811. 
29. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088, 12,089 
(Mar. 8, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). FERC envisioned efficiency of 
grid management improving "through improved pncmg, congestion 
management, more accurate estimates of Available Transmission Capability, 
improved parallel path flow management, more efficient planning, and 
increased coordination between regulatory agencies." Regional Transmission 
Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 811 n.3. The idea of grid management and 
coordination is not new, of course; a seminal work on the subject is STEPHEN G. 
BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER 
COMMISSION (1974). 
30. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 12,102. The 
minimum standards were divided into minimum characteristics and minimum 
functions. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 811. The 
minimum characteristics were independence, scope and regional configuration, 
operational authority, and short-term reliability. Regional Transmission 
Organizations, 18 C.F.R. § 35.34(j) (2004). The minimum functions were tariff 
administration and design, congestion management, parallel path flow, 
ancillary services, OASIS, Total Transmission Capability and Available 
Transmission Capability, market monitoring, planning and expansion, and 
interregional coordination. Id. § 35.34(k). 
31. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 12,102. No one 
form of organization for an RTO was prohibited, and RTOs could own 
transmission facilities. Id. at 12,089. FERC suggested that the characteristics 
and functions could be met through "ISOs, transcos, combinations of the two, or 
even new organization forms." Id. 
32. Id. at 12,109. 
33. See, e.g., id. at 12,089. 
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surprising that utilities owning transmission systems were not 
falling over themselves to join RTOs voluntarily, as the transfer of 
operational control or ownership over transmission systems was 
frequently against their self-interest. 
FERC's response was at once predictable and unpredictable. It 
issued a proposed rule effectively requiring utilities to join RTOs,34 
which was a not wholly unexpected response to Order No. 2000's 
shortcomings. This proposal became known as "SMD" (Standard 
Market Design)35 after a series of central features that took it 
beyond Order No. 2000; for example, it sought to impose Locational 
Marginal Pricing ("LMP") on utilities by requiring market-based 
congestion management systems.36 The marginal price of electricity 
at nodes in the transmission system would govern the transmission 
component of pricing and signal bottlenecks in the system. To help 
cope with congestion on the grid, RTOs would use Firm 
Transmission Rights ("FTRs"), designed to protect customers from 
the costs associated with congestion. They allow customers to 
schedule service to the paths covered in their rights without having 
to pay for congestion or running the risk of curtailment. 37 This 
enables market participants to enter into contracts with a locked-in 
price. FTRs, in FERC's view, allow for maximum utilization of 
valuable, scarce grid capacity and therefore lower costs to 
consumers. 
38 The use of FTRs and other signals would in turn be 
used as the basis of a process to determine where additional 
transmission capacity would be built. How this would work was left 
for later. 
The backlash to SMD has been well documented. 39 Perhaps its 
34. Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission 
Service and Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452, 55,455 
(Aug. 29, 2002) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). FERC's mandatory RTO 
requirement effectively required all utilities to turn over control of their 
facilities to an "Independent Transmission Provider" ("ITP"). Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 55,480. 
37. Id. at 55,476. 
38. Id. at 55,455-56. 
39. See, e.g., MARK COOPER, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., ALL PAIN, No GAIN: 
RESTRUCTURING AND DEREGULATION IN THE INTERSTATE ELECTRICITY MARKET, at 
iii (2002) ("FERC's Standard Market Design puts consumers further at risk."), 
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/allpain.pdf; Hullihen Williams Moore, 
Competition: The Wrong Goal, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 739 (2005). An excellent 
summary of how one state (Virginia) protested SMD is found in B. Paige E. 
Holloway, Public Utility Law, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 195, 202 (2003) ("The 
[Virginia State Corporation Commission] takes issue with the FERC's proposed 
SMD Rule in its comments, concluding that 'both in concept and execution, the 
proposed rules are fundamentally flawed, and should be withdrawn by the 
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fullest expression can be found in the energy bill pending in 
Congress in 2004. House Resolution 6 would have imposed an 
outright moratorium on FERC's ability to promulgate SMD, created 
"sense of the Congress" language that RTOs should be formed 
voluntarily (reversing FERC's initiative), added language to call for 
"participant funding'' of transmission upgrades,40 created priority for 
"native load" in transmission service, and weakened FERC's merger 
review authority.41 It is hard to imagine a purer expression of the 
ferocity of anti-SMD sentiment. Whether or not these provisions see 
the light of day-and given the uncertain prospects for energy 
legislation generally, this is difficult to predict42-FERC was put in a 
position where its opponents were (and continue to be) determined 
to make sure deregulation does not happen under its watch. 
FERC's response to this backlash was a White Paper entitled 
''Wholesale Power Market Platform," issued in 2003.43 In this brief 
document, FERC reiterated many of its goals for standardizing 
markets and ensuring reliability in the grid through uniform 
procedures, stating that "providing regulatory certainty for the 
industry and investors in order to build needed infrastructure is a 
critical need facing the energy industry and requires Commission 
action."44 It restated that it would eventually promulgate a final 
rule that would require that all public utilities join an RTO. As in 
Order No. 2000 and SMD, that final rule will require that the RTO 
be the sole provider of transmission service. 45 Also, as provided in 
Order No. 2000, the RTO would be responsible for planning for the 
[FERCJ in favor of a thorough examination of the critical issues encompassed by 
them.'" (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Va. State 
Corp. Comm'n, Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, No. RMOl-12-000 
(Jan. 31, 2003))). 
40. The proposal that "participants" (generators benefiting from 
transmission upgrades) should pay for new transmission capacity has been 
sharply criticized as "likely to delay needed construction and create new vested 
interests in maintaining congestion." Comments from Robert C. McDiarmid et 
al., Attorneys for Transmission Access Policy Group, to U.S. Dep't of Energy, 
Designation of National Electric Transmission Bottlenecks to the U.S. 
Department of Energy 15 (Sept. 20, 2004). 
41. Energy Policy Act of2003, H.R. 6, 108th Cong. (2004). 
42. See, e.g., William A. Moore, Electricity Reform, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 15, 
2004, at 39 ("[T]he prospects for final adoption by the Senate of an energy bill 
that is also acceptable to the House remain uncertain."). 
43. FERC, White Paper: Wholesale Power Market Platform (Apr. 28, 2003), 
available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electridindus-act/smd/white_paper. 
pdf. 
44. Id. at 1. 
45. Id. at 2. 
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siting of new transmission lines.46 FERC further stated that 
"[r]egions should develop an approach to manage congestion that 
protects against manipulation, uses the grid efficiently, and 
promotes use of the lowest cost generation"47 and that it would 
require RTOs to "have transparent market mechanisms with 
efficient price signals" in effect within one year.48 FERC signaled 
that perhaps some approach other than LMP could be used to 
manage congestion in a given region. 
While all this regulatory activity drags on, trouble looms ahead 
on a number of fronts. In the blackout of 2003, over 50 million 
people lost power.49 The transmission system is vulnerable to 
outages of this sort, and the reasons for this are complex. Some 
suggest that the advent of competition was a major contributing 
factor in the blackout. This is not entirely accurate, as human 
errors in controlling the grid were far more important.50 However, 
competition has played a part by making the system much more 
complex and hence more difficult to govern.51 The transmission 
system was not designed with a competitive market in mind, and we 
are asking the grid to do what it may not be able to do without 
attention to both improved grid management and bolstered physical 
infrastructure. The 2003 Long-Term Reliability Assessment of the 
North American Electricity Reliability Council, the voluntary 
organization responsible for grid reliability, states that "North 
American transmission systems are expected to perform reliably in 
the near term,',s2 but portions of the grid are reaching their 
reliability limits because of increased customer demand and 
increased power transfers brought on by competition.53 The best 
indicator of this is probably the considerable increase in the amount 
of "Transmission Loading Relief' ("TLR"), a procedure used to 
allocate transmission capacity when requests for transmission 
46. Id. at 7. 
47. Id. at 9. 
48. Id. at 10. 
49. U.S.-CAN. POWER SYSTEM OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE 
AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2004), available at http://www.ferc.gov/cust-protect/moi/ 
blackout.asp [hereinafter BLACKOUT TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
50. Id. at 17-21. 
51. Id. 
52. NORTH AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, 2003 LONG-TERM RELIABILITY 
AsSESSMENT: THE RELIABILITY OF BULK ELECTRIC SYSTEMS IN NORTH AMERICA 5 
(2003), available at ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all_updVdocs/pubs/ 
LTRA2003.pdf [hereinafter NAERC LONG-TERMAsSESSMENT]. 
53. Id. 
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exceed the system capacity.54 TLRs are not a solution to the problem 
of congestion on the grid but demonstrate the need for increased 
capacity. 
There has been no increase in transmission capacity to keep 
pace with the massive influx of new merchant power and the 
demands placed on the system.55 The nation's transmission grid is 
overstressed.56 This is not surprising, as throughout the 1990s it 
was more rewarding for private actors to build new merchant plants 
than transmission capacity. The trend is expected to continue. 
From 2002 to 2012, national electricity demand is expected to 
increase twenty percent,57 but construction of high-voltage 
transmission facilities will not keep up. Investment in transmission 
has lagged for other reasons besides economic incentives that favor 
generation.58 Building new transmission lines is complex, expensive, 
and politically sensitive,59 as perhaps demonstrated most vividly in 
54. See Linda G. Stuntz, Symposium Materials from the University of 
Richmond School of Law Symposium, The Blackout of 2003: What's Next? 
Transmission Investment, Restructuring and the Future of the Electric Utility 
Industry 12-13 (Apr. 2, 2004) (on file with author) (noting that the TLR record 
shows there is "[i]ncreasing congestion even in areas with RTOs"); see also U.S. 
DEp'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY, at ix (2002), available at 
http://www. pi.energy .gov/pdf/libraryfl'ransmissionGrid. pdf [hereinafter 
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY]. 
55. Kelliher, supra note 12, at 726 (noting that "transmission investment in 
circuit miles grew less than 0.5 percent annually between 1998 and 2001"); see 
also NAERC LoNG-TERM AsSESSMENT, supra note 52, at 5; NATIONAL 
TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY, supra note 54, at 7; TRANSMISSION ACCESS POLICY 
STUDY (TAPS) GROUP, EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS FOR GETTING NEEDED TRANSMISSION 
BUILT AT REASONABLE COST 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.tapsgroup.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/effectivesolutions. p 
df [hereinafter TAPS GROUP STUDY]. Industry executives are keenly aware of 
this stagnation in transmission investment. See, e.g, Gordon van Welie, 
Symposium Materials from the University of Richmond School of Law 
Symposium, The Blackout of 2003: What's Next? Transmission Investment, 
Restructuring and the Future of the Electric Utility Industry (Apr. 2, 2004) (on 
file with author) (stating that the CEO ofnow-RTO ISO-New England is calling 
for increased investment in transmission). 
56. See NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY, supra note 54, at 24. 
57. Id. at 4, 7. 
58. NAERC LONG-TERM AsSESSMENT, supra note 52, at 5; Kelliher, supra 
note 12, at 726-29 (discussing stagnation in transmission investment and the 
need to promote investment in new capacity). 
59. See Jim Rossi, Moving Public Law Out of the Deference Trap in 
Regulated Industries, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617, 636-48 (2005) [hereinafter 
Rossi, Moving Public Law]; see also Jim Rossi, Transmission Siting in 
Deregulated Wholesale Power Markets: Re-imaging the Role of Courts in 
Resolving Federal-State Impasses, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL 'y F. (forthcoming 
Spring 2005) (manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Rossi, Re-imaging 
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recent years by the wrangling over the construction and operation of 
the Cross-Sound Cable between Connecticut and Long Island.60 
There is a lack of cooperative decision making for transmission 
planning. With the grid being essentially two large, interconnected 
systems,61 small changes to any one part of the system have 
magnified impacts throughout the industry,62 and a comprehensive 
plan for necessary improvements is essential.63 Quite literally, 
however, there is fundamental disagreement over the bottom-line 
responsibility for building and maintaining adequate transmission 
capacity: is this the function of RTOs, incumbent utilities, the 
federal government, or all or none of the above? At present, there is 
no solution in place for long-run transmission planning. 
Finally, no account of the uncertain state of restructuring is 
'complete without a discussion of the retrenchment currently taking 
place in retail competition at the state level. Order No. 888 began 
the process of requiring utilities functionally to unbundle (separate) 
their transmission and generation services. The idea, as in the cable 
and phone industries, was that competitors would avoid building 
duplicative local distribution facilities. Instead, incumbent utilities 
would carry the power of independent generators over their lines. 
In the aftermath of competition's disastrous failure in the early 
2000s in California,64 states are beginning to slow, alter, or even 
the Role]. 
60. Rossi, Moving Public Law, supra note 59, at 644-48; see also Kelliher, 
supra note 12, at 728 (discussing the current status of the Cross Sound Cable); 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy, and Market Entry, 16 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'v F. (forthcoming Spring 2005) (manuscript at 17-20, on 
file with author) [hereinafter Pierce, Environmental Regulation]; Rossi, Re-
imaging the Role, supra note 59 (manuscript at 2-6). 
61. See NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY, supra note 54, at 2. 
62. See BLACKOUT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 49, at 30. 
63. There is also the threat of terrorist acts to consider. We are dependent 
on electricity for almost every aspect of daily life. The transmission grid, due to 
its interconnected properties and overstressed condition, is vulnerable to an 
intentional attack. Although some sectors of the economy could function 
without the grid (some have their own sources of electricity through using, for 
example, generators), widespread loss of grid functions would still be 
devastating. The international task force reporting on the August 2003 
blackout found it important to plan for improvements to the grid to alleviate 
these shortcomings. See id. at 139-70 (discussing recommendations to abate the 
scope of any blackout). 
64. There are many excellent articles and books on the California crisis, 
and it would be difficult to cite any one without slighting the outstanding work 
of other authors. The National Council on Electricity Policy report takes a 
broad view of restructuring's future in the aftermath of California and contains 
a wealth of useful recommendations. MA'ITHEW H. BROWN & RICHARD P. 
SEDANO, NAT'L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POL 'v, A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF U.S. 
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reject progress toward restructuring, even where it had been 
embraced earlier.65 As California's situation was somewhat unique, 
it would be inappropriate to blame the slow pace of retail 
competition across the nation wholly on that state's woes. 
Nonetheless, in many states, meaningful competition is not taking 
place and has been pushed off into the future. States such as 
Pennsylvania that moved early toward competition have seen a drop 
in the number of companies competing with incumbents; fewer 
competitive offers are being made and few residential customers are 
taking advantage of these offers. In others, such as my home state 
of Virginia, there are no meaningful opportunities for competitive 
choice at all, and none are likely to materialize for quite some time.66 
The current situation raises too many questions that lack easy 
answers, and any path forward or backward involves high risks. 
Moving forward with market mechanisms carries with it the 
omnipresent risk of Enron-like market manipulation. Who will 
monitor markets to ensure that manipulation does not recur, and 
what are these monitors doing? The difficulties encountered in 
developing adequate market monitoring mechanisms amply 
demonstrate that no one really knows how to shield consumers 
against manipulation, even FERC.67 How exactly would the use of 
ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING WITH POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE FuTURE (2003), 
available at http://www.ncouncil.org/restruc.pdf. The California debacle had 
far-reaching ramifications-it became a factor in the opposition of groups as 
disparate as labor unions and other constituencies to the 2004 energy bill. See, 
e.g., UAW, Energy and the Environment, at http://www.uaw.org/cap/04/ 
issues/issue05.cfm (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). 
65. Many states have delayed restructuring or have retained "bundled" 
(traditional, non-deregulated) status. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Status of State 
Electric Industry Restructuring Activity-as of February 2003, at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/restructure. pdf (last modified 
Feb. 1, 2003); see also BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 64, at 25 (noting that only 
twenty-four states had moved toward competition as of 2000); Tomain, supra 
note 10, at 438. 
66. See VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, 2004 STATUS REPORT PART II: STATUS OF 
RETAIL ACCESS AND COMPETITION IN THE COMMONWEALTH, at i-ii (2004) (noting 
that "there is little competitive activity in the Commonwealth"), available at 
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/caseinfo/reports/2004_part_2.pdf. Recognizing that 
competition would take longer, Virginia recently amended its restructuring law 
to extend transitional rate caps until 2010. VA. CODE ANN.§ 56-582(F) (Michie 
2004); see also Carolyn Shapiro, Va. Senate Vote Allows Power Deregulation to 
Progress, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, at http://home.hamptonroads.com/stories/story.cfm? 
story=65483&ran=65367 (Jan. 21, 2004) (quoting Sen. Frank W. Wagner's 
statement that "[w]e haven't gotten competition yet, and this bill is going to 
allow us to see whether competition will work"). 
67. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 39, at 744 ("[Clan all aspects of the energy 
market be monitored in a timely and effective manner? This question is not 
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markets translate into the building of new transmission capacity? 
Should RTOs administer the transmission planning system or 
should state PUCs have a strong role? The unique characteristics of 
electricity warrant a system in which generation, transmission, and 
distribution are all independent, but with incumbent utilities 
continuing to own and control transmission facilities, what is to stop 
them from continuing to exercise market power?68 Not surprisingly, 
without a good answer to this, incumbent utilities continue to have 
the ability to do just that. 
II. REGULATORY LINEARITY AND COMMERCE CLAUSE 
BRINKSMANSHIP 
Should restructuring simply end in favor of a return to 
traditional regulation? FERC would answer that question with an 
emphatic "no." It is determined to bring about market innovation 
that would transform this historically regulated industry. That 
alone would not be enough to call its efforts into question. One 
would expect an agency to support its reinvention effort during a 
difficult implementation period. A crucial question in deciding 
whether the experiment should end is whether FERC's actions have 
made it more difficult to deliver on the promise of innovation than 
would otherwise have been the case. As noted at the outset, the 
specific pattern of agency activity that I am concerned about falls 
into a category of "linearity." In this pattern, an agency has been 
constrained in its thinking about the reinvention effort, and second, 
it has seen the process in a "point-A-to-point-B" mentality that 
limits its ability to adapt to changing conditions. 
A. The Core of "Linearity" 
It will help to begin by clarifying what I mean by a "linear" 
process. First, I only apply the term to agency actions that 
constitute departures from traditional regulatory programs. 
Regulatory myopia in implementing traditional programs has been 
easy to answer and has not been answered."). An entire symposium at the 
University of Houston Law Center is being devoted to this topic. See Creating 
Competitive Wholesale Power Markets, at http://www.law.uh.edu (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2005) (showing a conference invitation that states that "[t]he 
difficulties associated with electricity market design have shaken public 
confidence, causing regulators to shift focus from market design to market 
monitoring. Yet, issues linger: What behavior should be prohibited? What 
remedies should be implemented to prevent and restrain violations?"). 
68. See, e.g., TAPS GROUP STUDY, supra note 55, at 6-7 (noting that the 
transmission system remains inherently uncompetitive as long as incumbent 
utilities own transmission assets). 
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thoroughly examined elsewhere and need not be taken up here. The 
size and scope of the proposed innovation will also be important. 
Some reinvention efforts-pilot projects, one-time exceptions to 
rules, and the like-would be so limited in scope as not to warrant 
this sort of systematic analysis. The critical characteristic of an 
initiative that deserves attention is that the agency is attempting to 
change its way of doing business in whole or large part.69 By 
definition, if we seek a situation where stalemate has occurred in 
reinvention (stakeholders perceive that it would be better to start 
over than to go forward), then it is not possible when the agency is 
applying the existing regulatory scheme to most of the regulated 
community. 
Another important factor is the extent to which the reinvention 
idea already has a track record of some sort. There must be some 
indicator that the agency has attempted more than once to 
implement its initiative-either it has floated one proposal and tried 
to advance it over a period of time, or it has made a number of 
attempts to fine-tune the initiative. Without the passage of time, 
there is no adequate record to use in judging the process.70 I do not 
view the trepidation about commencing down the path of innovation 
through the same lens as the stalemate existing once reinvention 
has proceeded for some time. Reinvention might be less costly to a 
stakeholder than traditional regulation, but the stakeholder may 
not wish to take that gamble when viewing reinvention from a 
complete-uncertainty perspective. 
Next, we face the difficulty of separating substance from 
process. Is there stalemate because the reinvention idea is 
controversial, difficult to implement, or flawed for some other 
reason? Or has the agency simply dropped the ball? In addressing 
this concern, there must be some explanation for the current 
disequilibrium that goes beyond implementation challenges. The 
electric power industry before the 1980s was a dinosaur, with the 
advent of competition representing a shock to the entrenched, 
comfortable culture of regulation. The transition to competition 
69. I also assume the initiative's initial goals remain largely intact. For 
example, any regulatory inefficiencies that the reinvention effort would remedy 
should be continuing unabated. If fundamental industry conditions have 
stabilized and stakeholders are not clamoring for change, pursuing the 
reinvention effort further would be pointless. 
70. It would be important to know here whether the agency proposes an 
idea for the first time, as the response may well be different from the reaction it 
would receive to a proposal of expanding a proven idea to a larger market or set 
of industries. As an example, an agency initiative to develop a trading scheme 
to reduce pollutant emissions might be rejected ab initio, but if it were, then we 
would certainly not conclude that the process in implementing it was faulty. 
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involves considerable issues such as the treatment of "stranded 
costs" (utilities' investment in infrastructure during the period of 
traditional regulation). 71 If grappling with these issues were all that 
was retarding the pace of innovation, then we would probably 
conclude that incremental progress would be salutary. So, the 
baseline character of the agency's process itself must appear 
problematic. 
How would we decide if an agency's process were faulty? First, 
I assume an agency acted with the best of intentions but now finds 
itself stuck. If the reinvention effort was cynical or calculating, then 
there is no reason to bother analyzing it; it should simply end. AB a 
crude measure of this, it would be important to know whether 
reinvention efforts had relatively broad support from diverse groups 
of stakeholders at the outset. There are some straightforward 
situations where this would not be the case. Some initiatives seem 
to have sprung directly from industry lobbyists' pens. In those 
cases, it is not difficult to resist going forward if momentum stalls. 
An agency flagrantly unreceptive to certain stakeholder groups 
should not be allowed to continue its one-sided experimentation.72 
Similarly, an agency acting contrary to existing law should not be 
allowed to continue disregarding it. 73 
In other cases where substantial constituencies opposed 
reinvention from the outset and may well have played a part in 
slowing or ending it, those constituencies will obviously be satisfied 
by its downfall. In today's charged climate for reinvention efforts-
where many see the efforts as precursors to the end of regulation 
altogether-this could include groups that preferred the status quo. 
Some cases involve agencies that seem grounded in a controversial 
ideological base. In cases such as these, it can be exceedingly 
difficult to decide whether the agency's actions or regulatory 
71. See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 64, at 18-20; J. Gregory Sidak & 
Daniel F. Spulber, Giuings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068 (1997). 
72. One suspects this would be particularly likely when the reinvention 
effort explicitly involves getting the agency out of the regulatory business-that 
is, deregulating completely. To represent that this is not what I have in mind, I 
will assume that "reinvention" continues to contemplate some form of oversight 
or other role for the agency. 
73. The controversy involving the electric power industry and the "New 
Source Review" provisions of the Clean Air Act illustrates this, particularly in 
the Environmental Protection Agency's advancement of a proposal that would 
set a threshold below which utilities could replace equipment without 
regulatory review. See generally Joel B. Eisen, A Critique of the Regulations 
Revising the U.S. Clean Air Act's New Source Review Program (Aug. 2004) 
(paper presented at the 13th World Clean Air and Environmental Protection 
Congress and Exhibition, London, U.K., on file with author). 
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philosophy (or, for that matter, both) have fostered the climate of 
stalemate. Presumably, if it were predominantly the latter, then we 
would decide that active opposition from the start, not the agency's 
process, doomed the project.74 So it would help to find cases where 
at the very least one could say that either the agency lacked a 
single-minded ideological bent, or, if it had one, it attempted to 
address opponents' concerns. 
Another baseline concern is the scope of the agency's authority. 
By definition, because the agency is attempting to innovate, it may 
lack the clear statutory or regulatory authority to do so. It is 
possible, of course, that it is seeking this authority at the same time 
that it is promoting the reinvention effort. If there is a clear sense, 
from a judicial decision or other source, that the agency cannot 
proceed, then we might be better off examining what steps are 
necessary to pave the way for innovation rather than critiquing 
agency performance. But if the lack of clarity regarding authority is 
not an absolute bar to proceeding with innovation, then the agency 
probably will not be able to claim that it could not innovate because 
it was hamstrung in its ability to do so. 
In some cases, then, it may be possible to attribute stagnation 
in large part to a specific external factor such as a lack of authority. 
Even when the agency may bear some blame, there must be some 
way to differentiate two fundamental types of cases from one 
another. In one, the agency is on the right track, and more effort is 
needed. In the other, the agency is on the wrong track, and 
continued effort would be counterproductive. We cannot distinguish 
these from each other by the mere fact that the agency has made 
multiple attempts at reinvention. Without knowing more, how 
would we guarantee that the fourth, fifth, or tenth time around 
would not be the charm? Perhaps reinvention is so difficult that it 
would take any agency, working diligently and responsively, 
numerous tries to get it right. 
One starting point would be a search for an appropriate 
measurement of success. There must be some remaining sense on 
the part of some or all stakeholders that innovation is worthwhile 
(otherwise there is no reason to go forward), but the lack of success 
and the nature of the process have turned some of them against the 
agency. AB on the children's soccer field, trying may be enough. If 
there is some reason to believe that gaining valuable experience 
7 4. In these cases, process and substantive arguments simply blur 
together, with reinvention opponents criticizing the process and vice versa. The 
resulting discussion would echo that which took place when the agency 
embarked on the course of innovation. Updating this discussion might be 
useful, but it would not necessarily tell us much about process considerations. 
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allowed the agency to embrace the spirit of innovation, then a 
partial success may well be better than none at all. The agency 
could regroup to reassess the situation and pursue another initiative 
later. The situation looks quite different if one cannot contemplate 
this regrouping taking place. There is no use in encouraging the 
agency to go back to the drawing board if it would simply stick to its 
guns the next time around. There must be a sense of a 
developmental process that would eventually yield results. 
A major difficulty in applying this yardstick is to determine who 
is empowered to judge a reinvention effort and what criteria they 
should use. After all, anyone dissatisfied with an agency's 
performance can charge that it is intransigent, ineffective, or 
unresponsive. The central attribute of this type of situation is that 
there are widespread assertions from former boosters that the 
process is now stuck. Thus, one useful measure of the deficiencies in 
agency process would be the dissatisfaction of a critical mass of 
previously supportive stakeholders. It would also be desirable for 
these stakeholders to have differing interests; if lobbyists for the 
industry consistently rail against the agency but others are content, 
then the process may not be deficient. 
B. The Centrality of"Flexibility" 
The extent to which the agency has used flexible reinvention 
strategies is vital to evaluating the sources of this dissatisfaction 
and possible remedies for it. Throughout the period of 
implementation, the agency should signal an openness and 
willingness to use different means of achieving its goals (and, 
indeed, a receptivity to modifying the goals if they prove 
unworkable). The pace and style of innovation should be as flexible 
as the initiative itself would be, viewed in comparison to traditional 
regulatory tools.75 Reinvention, as the name implies, must 
constitute real change. The agency should change its corporate 
culture to do things differently, both in substance (remedying 
inefficiencies of traditional regulatory strategies, for example) and 
in process. It is impossible to discuss the idea of reinventing most 
regulatory programs of the modern administrative state without 
noting that the process of designing these programs has itself been a 
recurring source of controversy, due in no small part to its 
adversarial nature. If the reinvention process comes to resemble the 
confrontational dynamics of notice and comment rulemaking-the 
75. This is not necessarily indispensable to reinvention. A doggedly 
determined agency could generate results, even if it took multiple attempts to 
do so. My point is that the agency should have an open, transparent, and 
flexible process. 
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agency proposes and the stakeholders dispose-then the agency has 
not truly changed. 
This begs a larger question. The agency should not change its 
ways simply because its original way of doing business has been 
controversial. This might well suggest a posture of deference to the 
regulated community that may be unwarranted. An agency should 
also not change simply to depart from convention. Some 
"convention," of course, may be existing law that constrains just how 
much an agency can change.76 Nor should we assume it would 
necessarily be less costly for the agency to adopt flexibility in its 
process. Regulating has high costs (the transaction costs in 
litigation over most rules is but one source), but there is no 
guarantee that reinvention would no~ ]:~e costly. Every time the 
agency takes a step forward, it has to reinvent the wheel, crafting a 
new process. The agency's time and effort in doing this must be 
accounted for, as must the costs of outside stakeholders' input (if 
any) into process design. 
Why, then, must the agency be flexible? The answer, I think, is 
a complicated one that reflects contemporary thought about 
organizational behavior. Modern life is complex and messy. Actors 
need to respond to this new reality. In particular, they need to 
manage constant change by pursuing strategies based on flexibility 
and adaptability. The inherent nature of current agency programs, 
particularly notice-and-comment rulemaking, is far removed from 
this, and agencies must evolve away from this dynamic. Flexibility 
is particularly essential in reinvention. It involves change, which by 
definition puts the agency in a situation of uncertainty and 
messiness. Also, the agency has made a commitment to doing 
things differently. It has signaled that it wants to depart from the 
norms it has followed until now. It cannot simply adhere to those 
norms when reinvention proves difficult. That, it seems, constitutes 
a central distinction between the process of developing traditional 
regulation and the course we follow here. 
C. The Expectation of Openness and Transparency 
There is one pragmatic concern to discuss further. The agency 
should pursue reinvention with a devotion to openness and 
transparency. It must sound unnecessary to say this, for a central 
idea of the modern state is to inject openness into the regulatory 
process. However, as the regulatory system has grown, there are 
76. If the reinvention process is contrary to an existing statute (whether 
substantive or one that sets limits on agency procedure such as the 
Administrative Procedure Act) or a Constitutional norm, then it should not 
continue. 
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many junctions (internal development of a regulation, for example) 
where the agency can operate largely without scrutiny. A principal 
justification for many reinvention efforts, then, is that traditional 
regulatory strategies are unresponsive to stakeholders.77 For that 
reason alone, they typically feature more involvement of 
stakeholders from the outset in designing the initiative and 
retooling it along the way than is typical otherwise. 78 There is often 
an expectation that this involvement will be present, and if that 
expectation is not met, then the initiative is less likely to be 
successful. 
An agency that seems preoccupied with its innovative idea can 
appear oblivious to the consequences of continuing to pursue it. The 
nature of its public-outreach efforts might be telling in this regard. 
If its reinvention process does not include significant and 
meaningful participation by all interested parties, then the agency 
can seem indifferent or unreceptive to the concerns of those who did 
not take part--consumers or public interest groups, for example. A 
public-outreach process 01;1ly has real meaning if the agency is 
genuinely responsive to reasonable concerns articulated to it. If the 
agency appears to slough off purported deficiencies in its strategy, 
then that raises concerns about the process. Another red flag is 
raised if the agency's justifications for innovation change over time 
as original arguments in favor of the reinvention effort are 
challenged. An agency that appears to be engaging in retrofitting 
its arguments to the idea, not retooling the idea, is unresponsive. In 
addition, it may eventually be left with indefensible arguments, 
having exhausted its best ones. This raises the cost to those outside 
the agency in challenging those arguments, when all might be better 
off pursuing a different course of innovation. 
If the agency has committed itself to innovation but does not 
meet this expectation, it might well be the case that stakeholders 
discount all of its actions. We would eventually observe more time 
spent strategizing over and critiquing the idea of innovation than in 
undertaking the innovation. This is particularly true when actors 
have the power to tie up the agency in courts or elsewhere; they will 
spend time and effort to frustrate the agency's purpose when they 
can do so. Disenchanted stakeholders could retreat to a simple 
defensive posture (resisting all agency entreaties until the agency 
builds a positive record of success) or a more confrontational position 
of distrust. The latter is probably more likely if an adversarial 
77. See, e.g., David W. Case, The EPA's Environmental Stewardship 
Initiative: Attempting to Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 
EMORY L.J. 1, 88 (2001). 
78. See, e.g., id. 
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relationship existed between the regulatory agency and outside 
stakeholders when the reinvention effort started. If this climate of 
distrust comes about, stakeholders will view the process in 
superficial terms, where every argument is reducible to its lowest 
common denominator. In this era of instantaneous means for 
information dispersal, it does not take long for dissatisfaction to be 
translated into the very public staking out of adversarial positions. 
By the time this happens on a widespread basis, progress is 
unlikely. It creates a climate where stakeholders would be 
distrustful that the agency truly intended to change its corporate 
culture, which is of course directly antithetical to the mindset 
needed for progress. Thus, those outside the agency would probably 
react more strongly against the idea of innovation than might 
otherwise be the case. This has another unfortunate effect. If those 
outside the agency see an approach to innovation that appears 
calculated to downplay any ideas other than the agency's original 
ones-whether or not that is in fact the case-they are unlikely to 
generate new ideas of their own to break the stalemate. Instead of 
engaging in productive planning and thinking about the future, 
groups will stereotype each other with negative sound bite terms: 
"free market ideologues," "reactionaries," and so forth. That, of 
course, suggests quite clearly that we have arrived at a climate of 
linearity. It would be better to start over. 
D. Evaluating FERC Under This Linearity Test 
A threshold question in applying this linearity test to FERC is 
whether its movement toward the market is the sort of reinvention 
worthy of testing. After all, as FERC Commissioner Joseph Kelliher 
recently stated, the industry remains regulated even as it 
restructures.79 But it would be difficult to dispute that restructuring 
has introduced so much change to the industry that it ought to be 
viewed as an entirely new regulatory paradigm.80 That brings 
restructuring more clearly under the tent of reinvention initiatives. 
With that in mind, is linearity present in electricity 
restructuring? Unfortunately, it is hard to tell because the evidence 
is mixed. It is difficult to attribute the stalemate to one singular 
cause; so much has gone wrong (including the "perfect storm" of 
California and Enron)81 that it is hard to lay the blame completely at 
79. Kelliher, supra note 12, at 728. 
80. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 39, at 741 (calling "FERC's vision ... a 
public policy initiative that fundamentally re-orders and restructures an 
industry that is the life blood of our economy"). 
81. But see Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic and The Perfect Storm, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2003) (contending that although many authors 
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FERC's doorstep. One problem is that, from the beginning, 
deregulation has attracted an unusual coalition opposing it. With 
regional differences being much more important than ideological 
ones, this may well be one of the very few contemporary fields in 
which certain "red" Southern states and "blue" states in the Pacific 
Northwest see eye to eye. This reflects the realities that what is 
best for the Northeast may not work in the Pacific Northwest. 
As Professor Pierce notes, many states ferociously resisted 
FERC's initiatives.82 In the words of a prominent industry expert, 
these states treated SMD and the "Wholesale Power Market 
Platform White Paper" (''WPMP"), which is discussed later in this 
subpart, as a "Federal plot to deprive states of regulatory 
jurisdiction [over 'their' utilities,] ... facilitate retail access in states 
that did not want it [, or] ... to take away transmission rights from 
'native load' and give them to [someone else] .',s3 This is hardly the 
sort of climate in which innovation is likely or even possible, but is 
this the reason restructuring has failed (and thus, FERC could not 
be called linear)? Some would say yes;84 those from the anti-
restructuring states would say that an approach that lets different 
approaches work in different regions, instead of attempting to make 
one solution work for the nation as a whole, could have overcome the 
doubters.85 So it is not immediately apparent whether the political 
power of Southern and Western states is the root cause of the 
current problem, and I will have more to say about this in the next 
subpart.86 
Looking solely at FERC's conduct, and leaving aside the 
political and public relations damage caused by FERC's handling of 
the California electricity crisis,87 FERC's strategy of implementing 
have referred to it in this way, it is a misnomer to refer to the Enron situation 
as a "perfect storm"). 
82. See Pierce, Environmental Regulation, supra note 60 (manuscript at 
14). 
83. Sue Kelly, Symposium Materials from the University of Richmond 
School of Law Symposium, The Blackout of 2003: What's Next? Transmission 
Investment, Restructuring and the Future of the Electric Utility Industry (Apr. 2, 
2004) (on file with author). 
84. See, e.g., Pierce, Environmental Regulation, supra note 60 (manuscript 
at 13-20). 
85. A recurring criticism of FERC's restructuring effort is that it takes a 
"one-size-fits-all" approach to the entire nation in an industry with substantial 
regional variations. See, e.g., Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy & 
Natural Res., 107th Cong. 43-54 (2002) (statement of Marilyn Showalter, 
Chairwoman, Wash. State Utils. and Transp. Comm'n); AM. PuB. POWER Ass'N, 
supra note 25, at 20. 
86. See infra Part 11.E. 
87. Kelly, supra note 83 (noting that· "FERC took a huge PR beating-it 
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restructuring has made anti-deregulation hawks even out of many 
who previously did not oppose it. One obvious red flag was raised 
when it retooled the restructuring framework several times. The 
process of putting forth new proposals in a relatively short period of 
time (Orders Nos. 888/889 and 2000, SMD, and WPMP) caused 
unnecessary confusion and resentment and made FERC look as if it 
were giving out unreliable signals. Of course, FERC continued to 
insist that markets would shake out any bugs that would spring up 
in the transition from the current system to a competitive one.88 
If market mechanisms are truly superior to traditional cost-of-
service regulation as a regulatory paradigm for the electric power 
industry, then by continuing to issue SMD, WPMP, and the like, the 
agency would eventually be vindicated. But FERC's ability to make 
this case was simply overwhelmed by the political backlash to its 
proposals. In particular, issuing SMD was a major process disaster 
for FERC because it extrapolated the PJM-LMP model to the rest of 
America. SMD's size also backfired on FERC. Even in a 600-page 
rulemaking, many major issues were left to chance. On one hand, 
FERC could be seen as advocating a one-size-fits-all framework for 
national electricity policy and, on the other, leaving vast 
uncertainties to be worked out later. 
SMD's breathtaking scope, contrasted with its frequent lack of 
detail, virtually guaranteed a negative reaction. The innovation 
FERC championed would extend virtually to the entire nation89 and 
would govern pricing of the nation's most essential commodity. AB 
for expanding transmission capacity, a substantial body of literature 
bolsters the notion that markets would signal transmission 
providers to build capacity,90 but this has not translated to success 
as yet.91 
was perceived as failing to protect the public and being too wedded to pro-
competition ideology to take needed action"). 
88. Not surprisingly, there are doubters. See COOPER, supra note 39; 
Moore, supra note 39, at 742-49 (detailing risks associated with reliance on 
market mechanisms). 
89. Except, of course, to nonjurisdictional utilities (utilities over which 
FERC does not have jurisdiction), but FERC encouraged them to join in. 
Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service 
and Standard Electricity Market Design, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,452, 55,455 (Aug. 29, 
2002) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
90. Perhaps the best-known proponent of this idea is Harvard economist 
William Hogan. See William W. Hogan, Transmission Market Design (Apr. 4, 
2003) (paper presented at Electricity Deregulation: Where to from Here?, 
Conference at Bush Presidential Conference Ctr., Tex. A&M Univ.), available at 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-whogan/trans_mkt_design_040403.pdf. 
91. See AM. PUB. POWER Ass'N, supra note 25, at 10 (noting that "[t]he 
Achilles heel of the LMP/FTR system described above is that it, taken alone, 
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The LMP pricing models have not been tested on a widespread 
scale, and there is no reason to believe manipulation and simple 
price spiking are not possible. Economists might well put their faith 
in the efficiency of the markets, but that might force a consumer in 
Denver to pay one dollar per kilowatt-hour for electricity on a hot 
summer day. If wholesale electricity prices spike and that price 
increase must be passed on to consumers, then there will be major 
negative repercussions in the economy.92 Complex issues about 
restructuring are being worked out in various committees, public 
meetings, and the like, but there is no guarantee that safeguards 
put in place would prevent a recurrence of the California energy 
crisis or other malfunctions of the marketplace. On the contrary, 
there are concerns that markets would not be efficient in "load 
pockets"93 and that nondiscriminato!Y access to the transmission 
grid is a recurring issue.94 
When confronted with this, FERC continues to insist that a 
standardized market will work. The WPMP issued on the heels of 
SMD's rejection simply reiterates that FERC intends to promote a 
national marketplace for electricity, without evidencing any notion 
that it has adapted to the sting of rejection. The WPMP reads like 
an executive summary of the SMD rulemaking. Rather than serve 
as a basis for constructive discussion-as the name "white paper" 
would imply-it is the politically maladroit, stillborn proposal of an 
agency that has been put on the defensive. 
By advancing a standardized formula for the design of 
electricity wholesale markets that involves a considerable amount of 
guesswork, FERC asks for trust from stakeholders with a limited 
does not ensure construction of adequate transmission infrastructure"). 
92. See Moore, supra note 39, at 746 (noting that in the move to LMP, 
"[t]here is risk of significant price increase and price volatility"). 
93. One constrained area with which I am familiar is the Delmarva 
Peninsula in the Mid-Atlantic region. See Letter from Allen Todd, President, 
Mun. Elec. Power Ass'n of Va., to David R. Eichenlaub, Assistant Dir. of Econ., 
Va. State Corp. Comm'n, Comments on Topics to Be Addressed in Third Annual 
Report to LTTF 4 (May 20, 2003) (terming "the cost of congestion that Old 
Dominion Electric Cooperative ('ODEC') and other transmission dependent 
utilities experienced in the Delmarva Peninsula under PJM's system of 
locational marginal pricing and fixed transmission rights ... [as] a major factor 
driving the 2003 [Virginia restructuring] legislation"), available at http://www. 
scc.virginia.gov/division/eaf/comments/facil03/mepav052003.doc; see also Pierce, 
Environmental Regulation, supra note 60 (manuscript at 17) (terming the New 
York metropolitan area a classic load pocket and calling for transmission 
solutions). 
94. AM. PuB. POWER Ass'N, supra note 25, at iii ("APPA member[] [public 
power systems] are unable to obtain or even retain long-term firm transmission 
service at just and reasonable rates [in RTO regions]."). 
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record of success to back it up. So the hallmark of linearity-that 
stakeholders have lost faith in the agency in large part because of its 
process-would appear to be squarely presented in this situation. 
Parties are reacting strongly against the idea of restructuring, and 
the predominant flavor of the debate is so pernicious that few 
stakeholders are advocating comprehensive solutions for escaping 
the current predicament. Too much time is spent on opposing ideas 
and not enough is being spent on generating new ones. And much of 
this, to some, is directly traceable to FERC. As one observer notes, 
"very few industry participants [liked SMD]-almost everyone saw 
something they did not like and which threatened their ability to do 
business. Instead of simply going back and fixing the primary flaw 
in Order No. 2000 (which might have had the support of at least 
some), FERC instead raised m~re hackles."95 
E. The States' Role in the Retrenchment of Restructuring 
"[W]e remain extremely concerned that FERC is aggressively 
moving forward ... [to] coerce RTO participation, preempt state law, 
and exceed the commission's own statutory authority. ,,es 
But I return in what must seem almost circular fashion to 
where I started. No story of the retrenchment in restructuring is 
complete without a fuller explanation of how some states have been 
able to exploit localized concerns and the split of jurisdiction with 
the federal government to their advantage. As another contributor 
to this dedicated issue, Professor Jim Rossi, noted quite presciently 
several years ago, "federal competition policy, even if limited to 
wholesale supply markets, cannot peacefully coexist with 
balkanized, protectionist regulation by individual states."97 He 
advocates the use of the dormant commerce clause and federal 
preemption as means to control the states' tendency to parochialism 
and other excesses.98 Not surprisingly, observers such as Professor 
95. Kelly, supra note 83. 
96. Letter from S. Governors' Ass'n, to George W. Bush, President, United 
States of Am. 1 (Feb. 3, 2004), available at http://www.psc.state.ga.us/electric/ 
federal/RMO l-12/President%20letter%20020304.doc. 
97. Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory 
Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public 
Goods, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1768, 1789 (2002) (reviewing CHARLES R. GEISST, 
MONOPOLIES IN AMERICA (2000), RICHARD F. HIRSCH, POWER Loss (1999), and 
PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE NATURAL GAS MARKET (2000)) [hereinafter Rossi, The 
Electric Deregulation Fiasco]. 
98. Rossi, Moving Public Law, supra note 59, at 632-48 (discussing the 
dormant commerce clause); see also Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco, 
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Pierce would require the states to relent, blaming them for focusing 
myopically on their own interests at the expense of national policy. 
To Professor Pierce, that is unpatriotic.99 
Unquestionably, the states have statutory mandates to protect 
their consumers. Thus, state regulators must do better than engage 
in guesswork on the pivotal issue of whether their ratepayers will 
fare better under competition. Many wonder legitimately if their 
consumers will be protected if major concerns about electricity policy 
are addressed by FERC, not their PUCs.100 This apprehension has 
played out notably in the context of a debate over the contours of 
shared jurisdiction. As noted above, the federal government 
regulates electricity at "wholesale"; the states regulate it at "retail." 
This split sounds easy to fathom. Certainly, I know the difference 
between a retail sale of a sweater to me by Target and a wholesale 
sale to the store by a clothing maker. When one begins to get a 
sense of what the terms of art "wholesale" and "retail" mean in this 
context, things get muddier. While a sale of electricity by a 
generator to a utility is technically at "wholesale" because it is not to 
the eventual consumer, the ability to regulate that sale carries with 
it the ability to dictate terms and conditions that can frequently 
carry over into the retail arena. 
The language employed by both sides has added to the 
confusion. The debate over jurisdiction to regulate electricity is 
frequently cast as one of great Constitutional gravity, as if it were 
yet another example of the "states' rights" versus "efficiency of 
regulation" battle all too common these days. 101 But the rhetoric 
supra note 97, at 1785 (noting that "[b]ecause interest groups are more readily 
able to capture the state regulatory process, as well as states' deregulation 
policies, state laws could potentially thwart full evolution of markets in electric 
power"). 
99. See Pierce, Environmental Regulation, supra note 60 (manuscript at 
17). 
100. See Moore, supra note 39. 
101. See Adam D. Thierer, Electricity Deregulation and Federalism: How 
Congress and the States Can Work Together to Deregulate Successfully, 
BACKGROUNDER, June 23, 1997, at 1, available at http://www.heritage.org/ 
Research/Regulation/BG 1125.cfm. Thierer states: 
Most of the parties involved in this debate do not realize that the 
controversy involves much more than just the electricity market: It 
strikes at the heart of the constitutional balance of power between the 
federal government, the states, and individual Americans. Instead of 
causing the parties to study the proper constitutional jurisdiction for 
the administration of electricity deregulation, however, the debate has 
become mired in political platitudes. One side chants "states' rights" 
while the other preaches "economic efficiency." The issue of 
deregulation is much more complicated than these two philosophies, 
and it deserves far greater study. 
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being employed in the pitched controversy over regulatory 
federalism, the backfilling and reinterpreting of the limits of modern 
regulatory programs after Lopez102 and Morrison 103 cast doubt on 
their Commerce Clause underpinnings, is a poor fit here. In the 
regulatory federalism debate, there is a historic clash between 
titanic forces-one bent on returning all authority to the states, and 
one determined to preserve the citadels of modern regulation. This 
situation is different and should be acknowledged as such. 
The Supreme Court's decision in New York v. FERC,104 despite 
some assertions to the contrary, is extraordinarily clear about what 
the retail/wholesale split means. The Court upheld FERC's claim in 
Order No. 888 of jurisdiction over the transmission component of 
"unbundled" retail sales (sales in states that have taken on the task 
of separating generation from transmission and distribution, that is, 
restructuring). 105 In practical terms, this means the federal 
government could assert jurisdiction all the way to a consumer's 
toaster if it so chose, excepting such exclusively intrastate matters 
as the siting of power plants. The electricity grid is a virtually 
seamless web of interconnected networks, and it is impossible to 
state in this day and age where transmission begins and ends. AB 
the retail price of electricity by definition therefore includes a 
transmission component (except where it can be said, as in Texas, 
that electricity is generated, transmitted, and distributed on 
systems that are wholly self-contained and out of FERC's reach), 
FERC could strip state PUCs of their historic powers or at least 
demand to share them. 
This is not a situation where jurisdiction is predicated on 
migratory birds flying across state lines and landing in mud flats. 106 
Electricity involves a national marketplace that reaches every 
American and cannot be carved into neatly defined or clearly 
distinct markets and regulatory jurisdictions. It is perhaps the 
clearest case of unfettered Commerce Clause jurisdiction extant 
today (at least in a situation where some parties believe the federal 
government does not have it). There is no reason after New York v. 
FERG to squabble over whether the federal government can 
Id. at 2. 
102. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
103. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
104. 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
105. Id. at 23-24. 
106. Of course, this is a reference to the well-known SWANCC case. Solid 
Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 
(2001). For one of the many articles about the case, see Robert R.M. Verchick, 
Toward Normative Rules for Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under 
the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 845 (2004). 
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regulate most matters relating to electricity. It can. By revamping 
the FPA (starting by giving FERC authority to regulate 
reliability),107 FERC could have all the authority it needs. One 
considerable irony here is that Supreme Court Justices who are the 
most skeptical about modern regulatory programs are also those 
who believe FERC has and should be more proactive. The Court in 
New York v. FERG virtually invites FERC to take over regulation of 
all transmission of electricity .108 
Thus, the fight over the Commerce Clause implications of SMD, 
WPMP, and the like was not over whether the federal government 
has the authority to regulate the electric utility industry. Instead, it 
centered on a much more subtle question of law and politics: 
whether it chooses to exercise that authority. Anti-deregulation 
states invoked the Constitution in opposition to FERC and its 
initiatives, but these states and their allies in Congress (where the 
pending energy bill would strip FERC of virtually any authority to 
impose SMD or a similar market-based structure) were at times 
engaging in "Commerce Clause brinksmanship": they made it 
appear as if there is a real Constitutional problem with FERC's 
initiatives where there most likely is not one at all. To say the least, 
this not only is not conducive to progress but also makes it more 
difficult to identify the real problem. 
F. A "Commerce Clause Brinksmanship" Case Study: States Resist 
FERG and Question Restructuring's Economics (The New PJM Cos.) 
The New PJM Cos., 109 litigation involving a who's who of utility 
industry players, is an excellent example of this ongoing battle. Due 
to its truly unusual posture, it focused on both federalism concerns 
and restructuring's merits. In this case, American Electric Power 
Service Corp. ("AEP"), one of the nation's largest IOUs, sought to 
transfer control of its transmission facilities to PJM Interconnection, 
an RTO based in Pennsylvania that serves the Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic Region. 11° FERC made AEP's integration into an RTO a 
condition to its request to merge with another utility.m With the 
clock running on that order, two states (Kentucky and Virginia) 
used their power effectively to prevent AEP from transferring 
107. Kelliher, supra note 12, at 720-24 (calling for "enforceable reliability 
standards"). 
108. 535 U.S. at 17 (stating that there is no language in the Federal Power 
Act "limiting FERC's transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale market" 
(emphasis removed)). 
109. 105 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,251. 
110. Id. 'II'II 61,251.2, .13, at 62,307, 62,309-10. 
111. Id. 'II 61,251.5, at 62,308. 
574 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
control.112 Thus, the case revisited the federalism argument 
introduced in New York v. FERC, with FERC this time using a 
relatively obscure statutory provision to order AEP's integration into 
PJM and bypass state law. Because this provision only gives 
FERC's authority over situations where integration would "obtain 
economical utilization of facilities and resources,"113 the case also 
became a laboratory to test the central premise of restructuring: 
that it would achieve economic efficiency and benefit consumers. 
The case arose in an unusual way. Under the FPA, FERC has 
authority to review and approve mergers involving utilities under 
its jurisdiction.114 In 2000, FERC approved the proposed merger 
between AEP and Central and South West Corporation on the 
condition that AEP transfer operational control of its transmission 
facilities to a fully functioning FERC-approved RTO by December 
15, 2001.115 AEP then made two unsuccessful attempts to join an 
RTO. FERC denied RTO status to the Alliance Companies, a group 
of companies (including AEP), 116 and subsequently, AEP negotiated 
unsuccessfully to join the Midwest Independent System Operator.117 
In April 2002, FERC ordered AEP to state which RTO it intended to 
join,118 and in response, AEP filed with FERC a document stating its 
intent to join PJM. Later that year, AEP filed for approval to 
transfer control of its transmission facilities to PJM, and FERC 
approved the application on April 1, 2003. 119 
AEP serves eleven states and needed approval from the PUCs 
112. Id. '!I'll 61,251.110-.114, at 62,325-26. 
113. Id. 'II 61,251.121, at 62,327 (quoting PURPA section 205(a)). 
114. 16 u.s.c. § 824b (2000). 
115. See 105 F.E.R.C. '!I'll 61,251.2-.54, at 62,307-16 (discussing case 
background). The merger condition came about in part as a result of a public 
hearing in which several interested parties voiced their opinion that FERC 
should not approve the merger because AEP and Central and South West had 
not made "a meaningful commitment to join an Independent System Operator 
(ISO) of sufficient size or scope to mitigate their market power." Id. 'II 61,251.3, 
at 62,307-08. 
116. See Alliance Cos., 99 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,105, at 61,431 (2002); NATIONAL 
TRANSMISSION Grun STUDY, supra note 54, at 27 (listing Alliance among RTO 
applications denied by FERC); THE CHANGING STRUCTURE 2000, supra note 7, at 
77. The downfall of the Alliance Companies' attempt to form an RTO shows 
just how difficult it is to get an RTO organized. While one company (AEP) had 
every incentive to make it work, others pulled out along the way. 
117. See The New PJM Cos., 106 F.E.R.C. 'II 63,029, '!163,029.14, at 65,300 
(2004) [hereinafter 2004 AEP-PJM Order], a{f'd, 107 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,271 (2004). 
118. See Alliance Cos., 99 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,105, at 61,545. 
119. See Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 103 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,008, 'II 61,008.1, at 
61,025 (2003). 
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in those states before control could be transferred.120 Two of those 
states-Kentucky and Virginia-took actions to block or delay the 
transfer. On April 2, 2003 (one day after FERC approved AEP's 
application to transfer control to PJM), Virginia amended its 
Restructuring Act to preclude Virginia incumbent electric utilities 
from transferring control of their transmission facilities to RTOs 
until July 1, 2004 but, interestingly, to require that they do so by 
January 2005.121 Three months later, the Kentucky Public Service 
Commission ("KPSC") denied AEP's request to transfer control of its 
Kentucky transmission facilities to PJM.122 
At this point, the case became sui generis. AEP had been 
ordered to join an RTO (itself unusual) but then had been unable to 
do so. It now faced conflicting deadlines that could not be resolved. 
AEP was in a pickle, to say the least. In response, FERC initiated 
an inquiry designed "'to gather sufficient information for moving 
forward in resolving the voluntary commitment made by several 
entities to increase regional coordination by joining RTOs' and to 
'explore ways to resolve the interstate disputes ... and enhance 
regional coordination to establish a joint and common market in the 
Midwest and PJM region."'123 On November 25, 2003, FERC used 
section 205(a) of PURPA124 to make preliminary findings that the 
proposed transfer should be approved.125 This subsection authorizes 
FERC to exempt electric utilities, in whole or in part, from any 
provision of state law or regulation which prohibits "the voluntary 
120. See The New PJM Cos., 105 F.E.R.C. ')[')[ 61,251.2-.11, at 62,307-09. 
121. 2004 AEO-PJM Order, supra note 117, ')[ 63,029.15, at 65,300; VA. CODE 
ANN. § 56-579(A)(l) (Michie 2004). 
122. 2004 AEP-PJM Order, supra note 117, 'II 63,029.16, at 65,300. 
123. Id. 'II 63,029.17, at 65,300 (alteration in original) (quoting The New 
PJM Co., 104 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,274, 'II 61,274.1-.2, at 61,916 (2003)). 
124. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-l(a) (2000). 
125. 2004 AEP-PJM Order, supra note 117, ')[')[ 63,029.1-.2, at 65,297. The 
important preliminary findings were as follows: 
AEP's voluntary commitment to join PJM is designed to obtain 
economical utilization of facilities and resources in the Midwest and 
Mid-Atlantic areas, as set forth in Section 205(a) of PURPA. 
... The laws, rules or regulations of Virginia and Kentucky are 
preventing AEP from fulfilling both its voluntary commitment in 
1999, as part of merger proceedings, to join an RTO, and its 
application to join an RTO pursuant to Commission Order No. 2000 . 
. . . The aforementioned provisions of Kentucky or Virginia law or 
rule or regulation are neither (1) required by any authority of Federal 
Law, nor (2) designed to protect public health, safety or welfare, or the 
environment or conserve energy or are designed to mitigate the effects 
of emergencies resulting from fuel shortages, such that the 
Commission may exempt AEP from those provisions of Kentucky and 
Virginia law or rule or regulation. 
Id. 'II 63,029.2, at 65,297 (footnote omitted). 
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coordination of electric utilities" if FERC determines that such 
voluntary coordination is "designed to obtain economic utilization of 
facilities and resources in any area."126 It contains a savings clause 
limiting FERC's authority to provide this exemption if the state law 
or regulation "is designed to protect public health, safety, or welfare, 
or the environment or conserve energy or is designed to mitigate the 
effects of emergencies resulting from fuel shortages."127 
Because FERC had thrown down the gauntlet to states using 
their power to oppose its drive toward mandatory RTO formation, 
the case quickly became a lightning rod for pro-deregulation and 
anti-deregulation states. Some, already suspicious of FERC's 
market initiatives, saw FERC's trumping of state law as 
diminishing their authority to regulate the industry and leading to a 
loss of cost control-historically the province of state regulators.128 
The novel use of PURPA section 205(a) to achieve this purpose led 
other states to criticize FERC's reasoning. 129 A number of Northern 
and Midwestern states (including Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey), however, supported FERC and 
called for regional coordination to take place without delay, which 
would prevent the benefits to be gained from integrating utilities 
into RTOs.130 The Texas PUC, not a player in this debate because of 
its unique status in the electricity regulatory environment, 131 joined 
the battle anyway, arguing that RTOs "are a critical element for 
vibrant wholesale competition."132 
In March 2004, a FERC Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ'') 
126. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-l(a). 
127. Id. § 824a-l(a)(2). 
128. See 2004 AEP-PJM Order, supra note 117, <JI 63,029.10, at 65,299. 
Although Virginia and Kentucky were the only states that prevented legal and 
procedural obstacles to AEP's integration into PJM, other states, including 
North Carolina, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana, supported 
them. Id. 
129. These included the Washington Utilities and Transportation 
Commission, the Public Utilities Commission of California, and the New Mexico 
Attorney General. Id. 
130. Id. <JI 63,029.9, at 65,299. 
131. Texas's electricity grid is not integrated with those of the rest of the 
nation and is therefore subject to limited federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., CTR. FOR 
GLOBAL STUDIES, HOUSTON ADVANCED RESEARCH CTR. & ENERGY INST., UNIV. OF 
HOUSTON, GUIDE TO ELECTRIC POWER IN TEXAS 2 (2d ed. 1999), available at 
http://www.harc.edu/powerguide.html. 
132. 2004 AEP-PJM Order, supra note 117, <JI 63,029.9, at 65,299. While 
generally concerned about federal preemption (which of course could not affect 
it), the Texas PUC also argued that Virginia and Kentucky could effectively 
preempt other states from enforcing their own orders and thereby "frustrate 
state initiatives designed to achieve ... regional coordination." Id. 
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made an order rejecting the arguments of Virginia and Kentucky. 
The Virginia State Corporation Commission (''VSCC") had argued 
that PURPA was inapplicable, stating that ''voluntary coordination" 
under PURPA meant only "the cost-based, tight power pools then 
known to the industry."133 The ALJ rejected this argument, stating 
that the transfer would create exactly the type of coordinated effort 
that Congress contemplated when it enacted PURPA a quarter-
century earlier.134 The ALJ also rejected arguments by Virginia and 
Kentucky that AEP's decision to join was not voluntary because 
AEP had made other RTO proposals, 135 stating it was "far more 
reasonable" to conclude that AEP was maneuvering to avoid 
"jurisdictional conflict."136 Virginia and Kentucky also claimed that 
the decision was not voluntary because AEP was forced to accept 
RTO membership as a merger condition.137 This argument, too, was 
rejected, with the ALJ noting that AEP was free to contest FERC's 
•t• . th rt 138 pos1 ion in e cou s. 
Next, the ALJ turned to the central issue of whether the 
transfer would "obtain economic utilization of facilities and 
resources" in any area. 139 This issue had generated reams of 
testimony from those (including the VSCC staff) who argued about 
the benefits of RTO membership. The ALJ disagreed with the 
VSCC on the proposed merger's benefits, finding that that there was 
133. Id. 'II 63,029.36, at 65,303. Howard M. Spinner, Director of the VSCC's 
Division of Economics and Finance, had claimed on this basis that AEP's 
proposed transfer of control of its transmission facilities to PJM did not 
constitute coordination or an agreement for central dispatch. Id. 
134. Id. 'II 63,029.39, at 65,304. The AL.J relied heavily on the testimony of 
Philip R. Sharp, who served as an expert witness for Exelon in the proceeding. 
Sharp, a former member of the House of Representatives, was active in the 
development of PURPA. Sharp testified that section 205(a) grew out of the 
continuing debate about increasing efficiency and gaining reliability benefits 
from greater coordination among utilities, and therefore encompassed actions 
such as the AEP-PJM transfer that would be designed to achieve the same goal. 
Id. 
135. Id. '!I'll 63,029.48-.49, at 65,306. 
136. Id. 'II 63,029.56, at 65,307. 
137. Id. 'll 63,029.57, at 65,307. 
138. Id. 'll 63,029.55, at 65,307. The AL.J found: 
Id. 
There is no evidence of coercion here. This is an entity that knows its 
rights and is fully capable of defending them. If it did not want to join 
an RTO, or believed the Commission was acting in excess of its 
authority, AEP knows how to pursue avenues to obtain relief. One 
can only conclude from the evidence presented on this record that 
AEP saw substantial benefits from membership in a Commission-
approved RTO, found PJM to its liking after the Alliance initiative 
imploded, and signed on voluntarily. 
139. Id. '1! 63,029.60, at 65,307. 
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"an impressive array of consistent expert testimony as to the 
benefits of the planned integration of AEP into PJM. "140 
Unfortunately, none of this testimony consisted of hard evidence. 
Instead, the ALJ relied on estimates from witnesses for PJM and 
AEP who argued that the proposed integration would result in a net 
efficiency gain under every conceivable forecasting scenario.141 The 
VSCC staff also argued that the costs of implementing the 
transaction had to be considered. 142 The ALJ agreed with the VSCC 
staff and concluded that "consideration of the costs . . . that will 
result from the planned integration is a relevant and necessary 
element of a determination whether the planned coordination is 
designed to obtain economic utilization,"143 but declined to find that 
this cost outweighed the benefits to be derived from integration. 
The second major issue in the case-whether the state laws, 
rules, or regulations of Virginia and Kentucky were preventing AEP 
from fulfilling its voluntary commitment to join an RTO-was also 
decided in FERC's favor. The ALJ noted that while PURPA did not 
allow FERC to mandate coordination, it did grant FERC authority 
to prevent states from "blocking or frustrating coordination 
efforts."144 The ALJ concluded that the Virginia state law clearly 
impeded AEP from joining PJM and was "precisely the kind of state 
action that PURPA Section 205(a) was enacted to prevent-a state 
law, rule, or regulation which prohibits or prevents the voluntary 
coordination of electric utilities for the benefit of regional and 
national interests."145 The ALJ also concluded that while Kentucky 
did not directly prevent the transfer of control, its statement that it 
would not act in contravention of a state statute requiring 
preference to be given to native load customers "freezes integration 
140. Id. en 63,029.95, at 65,314. 
141. Id. Cj[Cj[ 63,029.101-.103, at 65,315-16. 
142. Id. enen 63,029.92-.94, at 65,314. Later in 2004, Dominion Virginia 
Power, the largest IOU in Virginia, generated controversy by announcing its 
intent to pass on costs related to its own pending transfer of transmission 
control to PJM to Virginia consumers. Greg Edwards, Utility Wants Charge 
Gone; Virginia Power Wants Its Pilot Program for Retail Competition More 
Attractive, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 7, 2004, at Cl. 
143. 2004 AEP-PJM Order, supra note 117, en 63,029.100, at 65,315. 
144. Id. en 63,029.41, at 65,304. The ALJ concluded: 
It is clear that Congress intended to empower this Commission with 
the authority to decide what constitutes the "coordination of electric 
utilities, including any agreement for central dispatch" within the 
meaning of Section 205(a) of PURPA, and to resolve disputes 
regarding this issue with the collective public interest in mind. 
Id. en 63,029.42, at 65,304. . 
145. Id. en 63,029.178, at 65,330. 
2005] LINEARITY IN DEREGULATION 579 
in its tracks."146 
In June 2004, FERC affirmed the AL.J's decision,147 and the case 
took on an entirely new twist. Kentucky settled out of the case.148 
The VSCC approved the integration of AEP into PJM, as its hands 
were effectively tied under Virginia's restructuring statute. 149 At 
that point, a casual observer would be forgiven for thinking the case 
had become moot. But the VSCC, understandably, remained 
troubled by the existence of precedent under PURPA that would 
support orders to other utilities to join RTOs. It offered to settle the 
case with FERC, if FERC would vacate the opinion affirming the 
AL.J's decision.150 The VSCC argued that, "[i]f not vacated, Opinion 
No. 472 would represent an unfortunate precedent that will 
continue to contribute to federal-state tension and mistrust that will 
harm ongoing collaborative efforts between this Commission[, 
FERC,] and state utility commissions."151 
146. Id. 'll 63,029.193, at 65,333. The KPSC's statement in its order granting 
a rehearing of AEP's application to join PJM in which it stated its "willingness 
to consider additional evidence in [t]he form of analysis of cost and benefits of 
membership in PJM" stated that the ALl "should not be misinterpreted as 
indicating that the Commission will not carry out its statutory responsibility to 
enforce KRS 278.214." Id. 'll 63,029.191, at 65,332. 
147. The New PJM Companies, 107 F.E.R.C. 'll 61,271 (2004). 
148. FERG Affirms That It Has the Authority to Overrule State Roadblocks 
to RTO Participation, but Refrains from Doing So for Now; Approves Kentucky 
Settlement, FOSTER ELECTRIC REP., June 23, 2004, at 8. The report noted: 
AEP had already reached a settlement with the Kentucky Public 
Service Commission (KPSC) regarding the company's Kentucky Power 
Co. subsidiary's participation in PJM, and a related June 17 order 
approved the settlement. Under that deal, Kentucky Power is allowed 
to transfer operational control of its transmission facilities to PJM 
provided the KPSC retains jurisdiction over retail rates and the 
utility's participation in PJM's energy markets is voluntary. 
Id. at 8-9. 
149. As noted above, while Virginia's restructuring statute precluded AEP 
from acting before mid-2004, it required incumbent utilities in Virginia 
(including AEP) to join RTOs before January 2005. The decision approving the 
integration of AEP into PJM was issued on August 30, 2004. Order Granting 
Approval at 21, Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, No. 
PUE-2000-00550 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n Aug. 30, 2004), available at 
http://docket.scc.virginia.gov:8080/vaprod/main.asp; see also Greg Edwards, 
Path Cleared for Deal on Electric Lines, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 28, 
2004, at Cl. The VSCC staff had cited the statutory mandate to join by 2005 as 
further evidence that Virginia law was not frustrating the AEP-PJM transfer. 
This, to the ALT, did not address the original problem: the statute also 
precluded action until 2004, while FERC required it sooner. 2004 AEP-PJM 
Order, supra note 117, H 63,029.169-.178, at 65,328-30. 
150. The New PJM Cos., 110 F.E.R.C. 'll 61,009, '1!61,009.6, at 61,023 (2005) 
[hereinafter FERC Order Dismissing Rehearing Request]. 
151. Id. 'II 61.009.6, at 61,023 (first alteration in original). 
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The VSCC's offer received a considerable number of comments 
from state PUCs and utility companies, including those that had 
intervened in the case originally. The intervenors generally 
supported the VSCC, arguing for the most part that FERC had 
achieved what it set out to do when Virginia approved the AEP-PJM 
integration and that leaving the opinion on the books was not 
necessary.152 Other commenters supported Virginia's position that 
vacating the decision would ameliorate federalism concerns and 
argued that because it had not been cited in any forum, vacating the 
decision would create a "no harm, no foul" case.153 
Not surprisingly, FERC disagreed. It issued an order 
dismissing the rehearing requests due to mootness, rejecting the 
settlement offer, and refusing to vacate the opinion.154 It also stated 
that "[o]ur decision not to vacate Opinion No. 4 72 does not reflect a 
retreat from our commitment to federal-state comity on RTO or 
other issues,"155 which of course is a statement the VSCC and its 
allies are unlikely to endorse. But if the VSCC was to proceed 
further at this point, it would face a serious hurdle. PURPA section 
205(a) gives administrative deference to FERC, allowing the 
exemption from state law which prohibits voluntary coordination of 
electric utilities "if the Commission determines" that such 
coordination is designed to obtain said benefits.156 And, of course, 
that is exactly what FERC has done. For this reason, the FERC 
staffs findings, confirmed by the AL.J, would almost certainly be 
given great latitude in any federal-court proceedings. It may well 
take another case to decide whether the evidence about problems in 
load pockets and potential price spikes in wholesale markets 
outweigh the forecasts of pro-deregulation proponents. 
This hardly means, however, that this case was unimportant. 
In holding that the Virginia and Kentucky laws did not fit the 
PURPA savings clause, the AL.I revealed that the states disagreed 
strongly with FERC about the costs and benefits of RTO 
membership and thus highlighted a central issue. The AL.I believed 
Virginia wanted to amend its restructuring statute "essentially to 
prevent the integration of AEP into PJM"157 and "protect the 
economic interests of Virginia ratepayers by shielding them from the 
impact of the Commission's Standard Market Design . . . [and to] 
maintain the preferential treatment for Virginia consumers in the 
152. Id. <JI 61,009.8, at 61,023. 
153. Id. <Jl<Jl 61,009.9-.11, at 61,023-24. 
154. Id. <Jl<Jl 61,009.12-.13, at 60,124. 
155. Id. <JI 61,009.16, at 60,124. 
156. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-l(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
157. 2004 AEP-PJM Order, supra note 117, <JI 63,029.289, at 65,34 7-48. 
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operation of an interstate transmission grid by securing an 
opportunity to second-guess the Commission's decisions on RTOs."158 
The ALT also held that the record demonstrated that "the primary 
reason KPSC denied AEP's application to join PJM was the KPSC's 
belief that costs to Kentucky's ratepayers would increase."159 
According to the ALT, the "KPSC's denial of AEP's application to 
transfer functional control of transmission assets from AEP to PJM 
was largely based upon AEP's alleged failure to show that Kentucky 
ratepayers would receive any benefits from such transfer."160 The 
ALT further concluded that "while economic regulation may be a 
valid exercise of traditional state utility regulatory authority, in this 
proceeding, such state regulatory actions cannot be allowed to fall 
under the savings clause because those actions would prevent the 
voluntary coordination that is the purpose of PURPA Section 
205(a)."161 
Because PJM uses LMP to make fundamental decisions, 
Virginia and Kentucky clearly viewed AEP's integration into PJM as 
the lamb lying down with the lion. The core of FERC's argument 
was the notion that RTOs yield economic benefits to consumers. But 
the ultimate point is not whether or not this will happen. It is that 
the parties are fighting at great length and over a period of years 
about whether RTOs will yield benefits. This fight is costly to 
ratepayers. The time and effort spent litigating this battle-not to 
mention the time and effort spent in earlier efforts to integrate AEP 
into an RTO-could have been spent far more productively in 
crafting an alternative scenario that would have been more 
palatable to the utility, FERC, and other stakeholders. 
Looking at this outcome, Professor Pierce and others would 
probably blame the Southern states and their allies for dilatory 
tactics.162 The proceedings in The New PJM Cos. might indeed 
afford some support for this view that the protracted litigation was 
an example of state regulators captured by parochial interest 
groups. On reflection, that conclusion might be worth some re-
examination. The states, it would seem, are not without blame. But 
neither is FERC. Its estimates that RTOs will yield benefits to the 
industry are just that-estimates-and have been challenged 
strongly.163 In the face of hard evidence, states should be entitled to 
158. Id. 
159. Id. <JI 63,029.305, at 65,350. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. See Pierce, Environmental Regulation, supra note 60 (manuscript at 14-
15). 
163. See Moore, supra note 39. 
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assert their statutory and regulatory mandate to ensure that their 
ratepayers are protected. 
It is perhaps even more revealing to look at the fate of the 
VSCC's settlement offer. Section 205(a) of PURPA is "obscure"164 
and had not been relied upon in any recorded case since the 1980s, 
when the electric utility industry was far different from that of 
today. In these earlier cases, it was not used for the purpose 
advanced by FERC in The New PJM Cos. 165 and of course could not 
have been, as the development and implementation of the concept of 
a regional transmission entity was still many years away.166 Even 
when the case was essentially over, it was not; FERC insisted on 
letting its decision stand as a message to later negotiators and 
litigants. And the message this sends is clear. FERC has 
exacerbated the difficulties of moving toward the market by taking 
the PJM model, making it the basis for the "one-size-fits-all" market 
design and promoting it to the rest of the country. The VSCC (and 
even the FERC ALJ, for that matter, in confirming some of the 
states' arguments) made it clear that the severe disagreements 
about this issue have been brought about in part by FERC's 
insistence on marginal price-based models for electricity markets. 
But its stance in this case is a signal from FERC that it believes in 
the economics of SMD so strongly that it will contest them in any 
forum-even with ill-fitting arguments if necessary-with anyone 
who disagrees.167 That only guarantees more time and effort will be 
spent hashing out this issue, rather than working toward 
constructive solutions. 
164. Stuntz, supra note 54, at 9. 
165. Electric Consumers Resource Council v. FERC, 747 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), and City of Batavia v. FERC, 672 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1982), are the most 
recent cases to invoke PURPA section 205(a) and are not related to the current 
controversies. 
166. In the 2005 order, FERC acknowledged that its argument was a new 
one, stating that "[t]his case was the first time in which the Commission has 
considered whether to invoke PURPA Section 205." FERC Order Dismissing 
Rehearing Request, supra note 150, 'lI 61,009.15, at 61,024; see also supra note 
133 and accompanying text (containing testimony of VSCC staff member 
Howard Spinner). 
167. On a comparable note, see AM. PuB. POWER Ass'N, supra note 25, at 19 
(calling for FERC to "abandon its ['RTO-or-nothing'J approach to transmission 
policy"). 
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III. WHAT Now? 
"Thomas Jefferson would probably have approved of our electricity 
regulation scheme; Alexander Hamilton would likely have preferred the 
nuclear regulatory scheme. "168 
By now two things should be clear to the reader. First, the 
current stalemate appears much more like that Gordian Knot than 
the work of an obtuse band of regulators. Stakeholders in 
restructuring are operating in a climate of deep distrust (when the 
word "mistrust" is used in a federal filing, one can only assume it is 
the tip of the iceberg), and the prevailing mood in restructuring is 
one of battle fatigue. The most visible initiatives amount to 
obstruction (the energy bill) or delay (the PJM litigation) of 
innovation. In the meantime, there is little measurable progress. 
The situation is a true logjam where everyone sees different but 
interrelated problems, all of which appear intractable. 
There is an unusually disparate group of vectors operating on 
the industry to retard progress: FERC's actions, states' 
parochialism, skittishness after California and Enron, and split 
jurisdiction between the states and the federal government, to name 
a few. 169 States were not lining up on one side or the other of The 
New PJM Cos. to contest the meaning of PURPA's arcane 
prov1s10ns. Two issues galvanized the participants: the states' 
rebuff to FERC and the uncertainties surrounding the economics 
and future of SMD. It is pointless to single out any one of these 
issues-or any set of actors-as the most prominent barrier to 
progress. 
If it were possible to start with a clean sheet of paper, three 
strategies present themselves.110 The first is to allow the 
continuation of voluntary experiments with RTOs that began with 
Order No. 2000, with FERC's regulatory role being limited to 
ensuring basic fairness. There are those who believe that we can 
learn from early failures and move on with better market 
mechanisms, specifically RTOs. We could allow RTOs where they 
work, not force their establishment elsewhere (as, for example, in 
168. Kelliher, supra note 12, at 738. 
169. See, e.g., AM. PUB. POWER Ass'N, supra note 25, at 1 (noting that, for 
these reasons and others, "[e]lectric restructuring has turned out to be a more 
complex, difficult and uncertain undertaking than most people imagined when 
FERC issued Order No. 888"). 
170. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 54, at 15 (showing a presentation slide that 
notes possibilities for "The Future" including going "[black to the 50s[-era]" re-
regulation, "[a] Federal Solution," "[a] Hodgepodge" allowing experimentation, 
and more events like the "Blackout of 2004 et al."). 
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the Pacific Northwest),171 and deal with remaining implementation 
issues as they arise. 
This would recognize that FERC made a political mistake by 
expanding Order No. 2000 by attempting to force utilities into 
RTOs. Allow utilities to do so if they choose, or perhaps even 
encourage it along the lines of what FERC has tried so far, and then 
the industry will evolve in productive directions. For that matter, 
RTOs might well be able to act as true independent third-party 
neutrals if utilities turn over complete control of their transmission 
facilities to them. That is a big "if," as we have discovered over the 
course of the past decade. AEP's case, as noted above, is unusual in 
that FERC could and did order this in the course of a utility merger; 
in other cases, we may find ourselves with a nationwide set of 
diverse arrangements, 172 some superior to the current situation and 
some not. As we have learned from natural-gas deregulation, 
partial deregulation is sometimes difficult to prefer unconditionally 
to the status quo ex ante.173 
A problem with this approach is that a variety of stakeholders 
would oppose any RTO (created voluntarily or not) where the core 
mechanism for dealing with transmission pricing and congestion is 
LMP.174 Also, the remaining regions of the country without RTOs 
are different from those where RTOs have been formed. 175 Still 
another problem with continuing voluntary experimentation is that 
FERC embarked on SMD precisely because it realized that utilities 
were not readily joining RTOs. The New PJM Cos. is an unusual 
case, where a utility found itself under the gun to join an RTO; for 
other utilities, the road to RTO formation has been extremely 
bumpy and frustrating for all involved. Muddling through might 
make matters worse. 
171. The American Public Power Association's recent report on restructuring 
calls for regional diversity in the type of organizational entity responsible for 
transmission access. AM. Pim. POWERAsS'N, supra note 25, at 2. 
172. Kelliher, supra note 12, at 728 (noting that "[t]he reality is that for 
some time we will have both organized and nonorganized wholesale power 
markets"); Stuntz, supra note 54, at 15. 
173. See, e.g., Michael J. Doane et al., Evaluating and Enhancing 
Competition in the Interstate Natural Gas Transportation Industry, 44 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 761 (2004) (criticizing FERC's market-based rate policy in the 
natural gas transportation market). 
174. AM. Pim. POWER Ass'N, supra note 25, at 3 (noting that "APPA's early 
optimism" about RTOs "has dimmed . . . [as they] morphed into vehicles for 
implementing centralized markets for day-ahead and real-time power and 
ancillary services, and the use of . . . [LMP] to deal with transmission 
congestion"). 
175. Id. at 6. 
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Another possibility is to end restructuring altogether.176 It may 
well be, as was thought to be the case until just recently, that 
electricity is best off remaining as an industry of regulated natural 
monopolies. This might just put bad wine back in bad, old bottles. 
As Professor Rossi has noted, the alternative to restructuring may 
be worse than continuing down the current fitful path: "[R]egulatory 
backlash in reaction to failed deregulatory policies may risk 
recreating some of the very same problems that gave rise to 
regulatory reform, coopted by deregulation advocates over the last 
thirty years."177 Another problem here is that restructuring's central 
premise-whether a national marketplace for electricity would 
benefit consumers-has not been sufficiently tested. If the current 
stalemate, as discussed above, is in any way attributable to process 
blunders (FERC went about restructuring the wrong way, breeding 
a climate of obstruction or delay) and not to a central flaw in the 
idea of deregulation, then the irony is that FERC might eventually 
be right but might currently lack the institutional capability and 
credibility to reach out to stakeholders to bring about true 
competition. 
Still another possible solution is to expand FERC's authority to 
bring about full restructuring. One could look at FERC's recent 
attempt to outline its restructuring policy-WPMP-somewhat 
more sympathetically in light of its current predicament. It realizes 
it overreached with SMD and is doing the best it can in light of the 
backlash to promote competition. Of course, it has not found a 
compelling way to remedy what some see as the primary problem in 
restructuring-that it is "restructuring" and not "deregulation." To 
some, the power industry still rewards incumbent utilities that own 
both transmission and generation. 178 Solve that problem, and 
incumbent utilities will be less able to favor themselves in 
transmission bottleneck situations. But FERC lacks the authority 
to do this at present, and of course, if it did have this power and 
ordered divestiture in the industry (that is, true separation of 
generation, transmission, and distribution), then the resulting storm 
of protest would make the backlash from SMD pale by comparison. 
Thus, to give FERC a new or enhanced mandate to pursue 
restructuring through statutory or regulatory means may simply 
176. I am hardly the first person to suggest this as a possibility. See, e.g., 
BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 64, at 81-82 (outlining a return to traditional cost-
of-service regulation as a policy option). 
177. Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco, supra note 97, at 1789. 
178. See AM. PuB. POWER Ass'N, supra note 25, at iv (calling for "(j]oint 
ownership of transmission facilities by all load-serving utilities in a region" to 
address this problem). 
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recognize that the FPA was not designed to do what it is being asked 
to do today. When I was invited to contribute to this dedicated issue 
of the Wake Forest Law Review, I was asked whether the current 
unhappy situation of deregulation could be traced to a lack of 
appropriate statutory or regulatory authority for FERC to bring 
about change in the marketplace. This idea has some decided 
appeal. 179 Commissioner Kelliher stated recently: 
In my view, the time has come to make reforms to the 
Federal Power Act .... 
. . . At the time it was written, there was virtually no ... 
interstate transmission grid, virtually all generation was built 
in load centers, and all aspects of the business-generation, 
transmission, and distribution-were presumed to be natural 
monopolies .... 
The electricity market has changed dramatically since 
1935. Today, interstate commerce in electricity has exploded: 
the transmission grid is not only interstate, but international; 
much generation is located remotely from load centers, not 
even necessarily in the same state; and it has been 
demonstrated that there is no natural monopoly in 
generation .... 
. . . It is clear . . . that many of the assumptions that 
governed development of the Act are no longer valid. There is 
a need to reform federal electricity laws to reflect the dramatic 
changes that have swept across the industry .... 180 
As this suggests, it is time for a change, and a different way of 
proceeding is needed. After multiple failed attempt~ to design the 
179. The thick gorse of New Deal-era statutes such as the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act ("PUHCA") creates a pervasive sense that statutes 
designed for yesteryear are ill fitting to today's utility industry. See, e.g., 
Thierer, supra note 101, at 4. Thierer notes: 
Federal action is needed because many of the problems associated 
with the modern electric industry were created by federal statutes and 
regulations. The final and most obvious justification for federal action 
is that many federal statues and regulations distort or disallow 
competition in this industry. The Federal Power Act, the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), and other Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders must be repealed or radically 
reformed for true competition to flourish. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
180. Kelliher, supra note 12, at 718-19. 
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conditions under which a market will arise in this industry, it is 
time to acknowledge that there may be a different solution. That 
solution would reject the logic that has so far failed to get traction. 
But any new regulatory architecture of this sort has to confront a 
basic paradox. On the one hand, regulatory design must be flexible 
enough to encourage innovation and progress toward establishing 
regional or even national markets, if indeed that is desirable; on the 
other, it must not be so fragmented that it would encourage the sort 
of muddling through that has us at the current stalemate.181 The 
prevailing model of deregulation cannot be a market system whose 
rules are dictated in a "one-size-fits-all form" by FERC, whose moves 
are creating antagonism. Yet in some systematic way, regulators 
would need to find some way to accomplish true divestiture; 
otherwise market power will be a perennial problem. In addition, 
the solution would need to accommodate regional differences that 
created powerful pro- and anti-deregulation coalitions. It would also 
need to put any progress toward a market for electricity in the 
context of a unified effort to strive toward safe and efficient 
operation of the grid.182 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The state of the electric power industry in 2004 across the 
nation is truly paradoxical. The infamous quote after the blackout 
of 2003 that we have a "Third World transmission grid"183 is not 
accurate. Marvelous feats of engineering have given us a delivery 
system that provides electricity to millions of customers, with 
outstanding day-to-day reliability. But muddling through the 
application of different competition schemes has led to an unclear 
and incoherent regulatory structure, a great deal of uncertainty in 
the industry, a lack of uniformity in governing mechanisms, and a 
haphazard and incomplete transition to a fair and competitive 
marketplace.184 
In such an environment, there are those who would call for the 
experiment in restructuring to end. The point of this Article is that 
if an agency has reached this point in the lifetime of its reinvention 
181. Perhaps if we are not going to end restructuring altogether, then it 
would be fruitful to contemplate a more radical solution: the transfer of power 
from FERC to another entity or set of entities with more credibility. This would 
require statutory overhaul, of course, but that is in the cards in any event. 
182. Kelliher, supra note )-2, at 720-24 (calling for mandatory reliability 
standards). 
183. Jerry Taylor & Peter VanDoren, Cato Inst., Outside the Grid, at http:// 
www.cato.org/dailys/08-22-03-2.html (Aug. 22, 2003). 
184. NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY, supra note 54, at 24. 
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efforts by being "linear," then the experiment should end. In the 
case of restructuring, that is not the case, but two aspects of the 
situation make it exquisitely difficult to see this: an agency that is 
trying the same ideas repeatedly (FERC) and a complex set of 
variables that has hampered restructuring activity. Through this 
fog, the final point to be made is that if moving beyond the current 
stasis requires change, this should be contemplated. This industry 
is famously resistant to change, but if change is going to happen at 
all, it cannot take place the way it is doing so now. 
It is irresponsible to throw up our hands and refuse to deal with 
the situation. Electricity is America's most important commodity. 
The network of interconnected electric power facilities is national in 
scope, and the present problems with it cry out for a national 
solution. As others have noted in this dedicated issue, untangling 
its current problems may require too much change to expect in the 
short term, given how we are stumbling through to solutions. We 
may be in a second-best environment for the foreseeable future, but 
leaving the status of the system for making and distributing 
electricity in its current piecemeal status does no one any good. 
